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Abstract
In most macroeconomic models prices for consumption goods are competi-tive and consumers are treated as price-takers, which gives rise to the law of
one price. However, as the empirical literature documents, prices for the same
products are substantially dispersed. The consumers facing the price hetero-
geneity can affect the effective prices they pay by employing different shopping
strategies. In this thesis, I investigate whether price dispersion matters for shap-
ing macroeconomic aggregates.
In chapter 1, I study how income fluctuations are transmitted to consump-
tion decisions in the presence of price dispersion. To this end, I propose a novel
and tractable framework to study search for consumption as part of the optimal
savings problem. The search protocol can be easily embedded into a standard
incomplete-market model. As I show, frictions in the purchasing technology
generate important macroeconomic implications for modeling inequality and,
in general, household consumption. In economies with those frictions, con-
sumers feature smoother consumption responses to income shocks and the level
of wealth inequality is amplified.
i
In chapter 2, I study equilibrium properties of a standard model of endoge-
nous price distribution by Burdett and Judd (1983). In search economies of this
type inmost cases there aremultiple equilibria. I show that only some allocations
can be characterized as stable equilibria. Next, I propose a modification of the
original model, which gives rise to one unique symmetric dispersed equilibrium,
that can be used for characterizing every feasible allocation.
Finally, in chapter 3, I use the framework from chapter 1 to study the redis-
tributive function of monetary policy. I show that money injection to households
might reduce the inefficiency generated by non-competitive behavior of firms
thanks to an increase in consumption purchased by bargain hunters. This re-
sults in the reduction of the monopolistic power of firms and lower consumption
real prices.
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1
Shopping Effort in Self-Insurance Economies
I. Introduction
Household consumption accounts for nearly 70% of the GDP in the US.A good understanding of how household income fluctuations are passed
on consumption expenditures is crucial for credible quantitative analysis in a
vast class of economic models, when household consumption plays an impor-
tant role1. This paper provides a theory of the pass-through of shocks into con-
sumption when the law of one price does not hold, i.e. different retailers charge
different prices for exactly the same good. The theory is motivated by recent
strong evidence for price dispersion and heterogeneity in household shopping
behavior. None of those findings have been integrated into standard consump-
tion models yet and as I show they generate some important implications for
modeling household inequalities and, in general, the aggregate consumption.
1Just to name but a few: optimal capital income taxation (Aiyagari, 1995), the benefits of in-
suring unemployed people (Hansen and İmrohoroğlu, 1992), effects of fiscal stimulus payments
in a recession (Kaplan and Violante, 2014), the redistributional role of monetary policy (Auclert,
2016; Kaplan, Moll, and Violante, 2016), effects of a credit crunch on consumer spending (Guer-
rieri and Lorenzoni, 2015), the role of household debt and bankruptcy filing rates (Chatterjee,
Corbae, Nakajima, and Ríos-Rull, 2007).
1
Thestandard incomplete-marketsmodelswith heterogenous households (hence-
forth, SIM) in the tradition of Bewley (1986), Aiyagari (1994), and Huggett (1993),
where consumers insure against future income fluctuations accumulating a risk-
free bond, are a workhorse for quantitative analysis of consumption from both
macroeconomic and microeconomic standpoints2. Nonetheless, they underesti-
mate the level of risk sharing present in the economy and given income process
observed in data they have serious problemswith generating enough inequality3.
Especially, the former is of particular importance. As Heathcote, Storesletten,
and Violante (2014) point out quantifying existing risk sharing is crucial to eval-
uate the welfare consequences of counterfactual policy experiments4. In addition
to this, in their current form the SIM models completely abstract from any kind
of price dispersion and assume that the law of one price always holds, namely
all households pay the same competitive price.
Substantial and systematic price dispersion is a fact observed in data. A grow-
ing literature documents many examples of this phenomenon on both sides of
the market, between different households and between different retailers. (i.a)
Aguiar and Hurst (2007) show that retirees pay approximately 4% less for the
same goods than households with heads in their working age. (i.b) A similar
price differential is observed between non-employed and employed households.
Kaplan and Menzio (2015) used the same dataset and found that on average non-
employed consumers pay between 1 and 4% less for the same consumption bas-
kets. (ii) Moreover, price dispersion is also present from retailers’ perspective.
2See survey articles by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009), Guvenen (2011), and
Attanasio and Weber (2010).
3Admittedly, there are some models that manage to capture the right level of inequalities, but
they either assume the very risky income process as in (Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull,
2003) or substantial heterogeneity in time preference as in (Krusell and Smith, 1998).
4In a similar way, Kaplan and Violante (2010) argue that replicating the level of consump-
tion smoothness, a measure of risk-sharing proposed by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008),
should be one of the central goals in quantitative macroeconomics.
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Kaplan and Menzio (2016) and Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter (2016)
observed the average standard deviation of prices for the same goods amounts
to 15.3%. In addition to this, the authors identified that only at most 15% of the
price variance is due to variation in the expensiveness of the stores at which a
good is sold.
Second, individual shopping effort, which is measured as time spent obtain-
ing goods, varies significantly between households depending on their labor sta-
tus. Using time diaries Aguiar and Hurst (2007) documented that retirement-
age people spend on average 33% more time shopping than households aged
25-29. Similarly, Krueger and Mueller (2012) show that the unemployed people
spend between 15 and 30% more time shopping than the employed. Tradition-
ally, higher shopping effort is rationalized by search for lower prices. Thus, both
empirical patterns, heterogeneity in shopping intensity and in average prices
paid by households, are connected by the price comparison mechanism.
On the empirical side, I contribute to studies on the consumer shopping be-
havior. Using the American Time-Use Survey I find that unemployed and retired
consumers spend on average more time shopping. These observations are con-
sistent with the aforementioned findings made by Aguiar and Hurst (2007) and
Krueger and Mueller (2012). What is new in my analysis is that conditioned on
being employed, households from top earnings deciles spend about 12% more
time shopping than poor employed households. This observation together with
the fact that rich households pay higher prices5 seem to stay at odds with the tra-
ditional mechanism relying on the price comparison motive. This suggests that
apart from price hunting there must be another motive driving shopping effort
in such a fashion that rich people spend more time purchasing goods. High earn-
5Aguiar and Hurst (2007) documented households earning more than $70,000 a year pay 2.1
percent more than households earning less than $30,000 a year.
3
ers are also households that consume more. Therefore, the observed increase in
their shopping time can be driven not by the price search intensity, but rather by
willingness to increase their consumption. The findings obtained in the empirical
part are used for disciplining the behavior of my quantitative model.
In the theoretical part, I integrate search for consumption into a life-cycle
version of the SIM model due to İmrohoroğlu, İmrohoroğlu, and Joines (1995);
Huggett (1996); Ríos-Rull (1996). The household’s income is driven by idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks. Every household makes the decision about level of
savings, that are used to insure against the future income fluctuations and to
smooth the future consumption. The remaining disposable resources of the house-
hold are spent on consumption. I extend the benchmark SIM economy by adding
frictions in the purchasing technology. Households have to exert effort to pur-
chase goods. This effort can be decomposed into two components: 1. price search
intensity – effort to search for price bargains, 2. purchase effort – effort required
to purchase consumption of a given size6. Both retailers and households’ shop-
ping come together at random through a frictional meeting process. Households
that search for low pricemore intensively are able to find lower pricesmore often.
Households exhibiting higher purchase effort are able to obtain more consump-
tion. Retailers set their prices in response to the distribution of household search
intensity. Sellers charging relatively high (low) prices sell less (more) often but
with higher (lower) markups. In an equilibrium every seller yields the same
profits, but for different prices the profit comes from a different combination of
appropriation of consumer surplus and stealing customers of other competing
retailers. To the best of my knowledge, the proposed model is the first to com-
bine the optimal savings problem and search for consumption in a quantitatively
6A size of consumption might be understood in three ways: quantity, variety, and quality.
In the model I focus on quantity but it can be extended to variety very easily, if preferences of
households are modeled as in Wolinsky (1986).
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meaningful way.
Finally, I juxtapose the aggregate consumptions of two versions of calibrated
economies, the SIM economy without product-market frictions and the “shop-
ping” economywith frictions in the purchasing technology. I use two alternative
approaches to study their properties: 1. consumption responses to idiosyncratic
income shocks; and 2. cross-sections of households’ decisions (consumption ex-
penditures) and endogenous states (net wealth). Consumption responses reflect
the dynamic character of the aggregate demand, while cross-sections of decisions
and endogenous states determine the initial state of any counterfactual experi-
ments. Thus, an accurate measure of both is of particular interest for quantita-
tive analyses. Using simulated panels, I show that in the SIM economy without
product-market friction households overreact to income changes and 80% of per-
manent shocks are translated to consumption7, while in the shopping economy
only 60% of permanent shocks are transmitted into consumption expenditures.
The responses generated in the shopping model are much closer the empirical
counterpart of 64% documented by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008). This
effect can be explained by the fact that marginal disutility for the shopping ef-
fort partially offsets utility of consumption, whichmakes consumption responses
smoother. Even if the shopping generates smoother consumptions responses, it
also amplifies wealth and consumption inequality. Consumption expenditures
are more dispersed in the shopping economy due to disentangling consumption
from consumption expenditures. Poor households with lower consumption exert
higher price search intensity. As a result, they pay lower prices, which leads to a
lower share in aggregate consumption expenditures accrued to poor groups. On
the other hand, net wealth inequality is increased by rich working households,
7This finding is consistent with the “excess smoothness” of empirical consumption docu-
mented in aggregate data by Campbell and Deaton (1989) and in individual data by Attanasio
and Pavoni (2011).
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who detain from increasing current consumption due to the high utility cost of
additional purchases.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews connections
to the existing literature. In section III, I present empirical patterns of shopping
time by American households. In section IV, I present the building blocks of the
quantitative model and characterize the equilibrium. Subsequently in section V
I carry out the calibration to match moments observed in the US data. In section
VI I highlight the nature of price dispersion at play for the calibrated version of
the shopping model. In section VII I deconstruct aggregate demands generated
by two artificial economies, the standard incomplete-markets economy without
frictions in the purchasing technology and the shopping economy with product-
market frictions. Section VI concludes.
II. Related Literature
The idea that consumer search might have important macroeconomic implica-
tions for modeling aggregates is relatively new. Kaplan and Menzio (2016) pro-
pose a theory of amplification of shocks driven by changing shopping behavior of
households. To this purpose they build a model that combines consumer search
(Burdett and Judd, 1983; Butters, 1977) with labor search (Mortensen and Pis-
sarides, 1994). Despite some similarities in modeling product-market frictions
between my framework and theirs, it is important to note some remarkable dif-
ferences. First, in my setup price search intensities are determined endogenously
by household decisions, while the authors calibrate them to exogenous values.
Second, Kaplan and Menzio (2016) assume that agents are hand-to-mouth, they
can neither save or borrow and are not allowed to smooth their marginal utility
of consumption over their lifecycle. Consequently, my model allows address-
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ing important questions related to household consumption, which are beyond
interests of the aforementioned article.
Huo and Ríos-Rull (2013) and Bai, Ríos-Rull, and Storesletten (2011) offer an
alternative model of search for consumption. In their models the authors employ
directed search due to Moen (1997). In directed search retailers are divided into
locations that provide goods at different prices and lengths of queues. House-
hold with different earnings and net wealth visit different locations. I argue that
random search is a more natural choice for modeling consumption decisions for
two reasons. Affluent households are able to obtain goods in locations with short
queues and high prices. In this sense they substitute shopping effort with higher
prices. This behavior is common for both protocols, but in directed search there
is no limit for such a substitution while in random search households can sub-
stitute effort with prices up to the limit where they decide to be captive in all
transactions where prices are drawn at random. Consequently, without limits
of substitution between prices and shopping effort consumption expenditure re-
sponses in economies with directed search for consumption can be even higher
than in the SIMmodel without shopping frictions, which problems with generat-
ing smoothness of consumption observed in data is well documented (Attanasio
and Pavoni, 2011; Kaplan and Violante, 2010). Furthermore, the recent empirical
literature due to Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter (2016) and Kaplan and
Menzio (2015) shows that only 15% of the variance of prices is due to variation
in the expensiveness of the stores at which a good is sold. This finding suggests
to use the random search rather than directed search, where the market is split
into locations with different prices.
The search protocol used in my paper also relates to the classical model of
random search for consumption due to Burdett and Judd (1983). The household
problem is the aspect in which my approach departs from that model substan-
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tially. In the economy of Burdett and Judd (1983) all households buy a unit of
good and make a decision on their price search. They can either draw one price
from the equilibrium dispersion or by paying an additional cost they can draw
two prices and choose the lower one. In my model households make a decision
about the quantity of consumption and the probability of drawing two prices.
The former is important for introducing consumption search into the optimal
savings problems, while the latter has implications for properties of the equilib-
rium, stability and multiplicity. I study and compare equilibria of both models in
great details in the companion paper (Pytka, 2016).
The potential effect of search for price bargains on aggregates was recently
studied by Krueger, Mitman, and Perri (2016). The authors consider an econ-
omy, in which output does not depend only on capital and labor inputs but also
on consumption. This effect is obtained in a reduced form simply by introducing
consumption as another input in the production function. In my shopping econ-
omy this aggregate demand externality has intuitive micro foundations. Any
transfer targeted to poor households with high search intensity increases the
aggregate price search intensity. Retailers respond to this change by charging
lower prices and this results8 in a hike in consumption spendings for all house-
holds, not only the recipients of the transfer. As a result, the shopping friction
magnifies the effect of stimulus transfers.
Themodel developed in this paper relates also to concerns raised by Petrosky-
Nadeau, Wasmer, and Zeng (2016). The authors used time diaries to document
the average decline in shopping time in the Great Recession compared to 2005–
2007. This finding was used to call into question whether the shopping effort
can be used as an amplifier of shock propagation. They argue that in a con-
traction households should increase the shopping effort, if the theory of bargain
8Under the assumption that consumption is a normal good.
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hunting is correct. However, this argument does not have to be true, if the shop-
ping effort is constituted not only by search for price bargains but also by the
purchase effort associated with the size of consumption. Therefore, I claim that
introducing a new margin of shopping effort proposed in this paper is necessary
to reconcile the pattern observed by Petrosky-Nadeau, Wasmer, and Zeng (2016)
and the theory of macroeconomic implications of the price dispersion.
III. Empirical Patterns
I start by characterizing the shopping effort observed in the data. I follow the
literature (e.g., Aguiar and Hurst, 2007; Aguiar, Hurst, and Karabarbounis, 2013;
Kaplan and Menzio, 2016) and I use time spent shopping as a proxy for the shop-
ping effort. For this purpose I study time diaries, which document the allocation
of time of the American households. In particular, I am interested in the relation-
ship between shopping and labor market status, i.e. unemployment, retirement,
and the level of labor earnings. I show that conditioned on being employed, the
level of shopping effort exerted by households is positively correlated with the
level of their earnings. Next, the findings from this section are used to discipline
the quantitative model outlined in the subsequent section, IV.
Data. In the analysis I use data from the 2003–2015 waves of the American
Time-Use Survey. The ATUS is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and in-
dividuals are randomly selected from a subset of households from the Current
Population Survey. Each wave is based on 24-hour time diaries where respon-
dents report the activities from the previous day in specific time intervals. Next
the ATUS staff categorizes those activities into one of over 400 types. The 2003
wave includes over 20,000 respondents, while the later waves consist of around
13,000 respondents.
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Identification Strategy. To assess how shopping effort is reallocated across
different households i with different levels of labor earnings I estimate the fol-
lowing regression:
log shoppingi = α +∑j βjearnji + γXi + εi. (1.1)
To abstract from the discussion on the functional specification, I regressed the
dependent variable on dummies. In addition to this I logarithmized9 shoppingi
to include possible multiplicative interactions between covariates.
The variable shoppingi measures cumulative daily time (in minutes) spent
obtaining goods or services (excluding education, restaurant meals, and medical
care) and travels related to these activities. Some examples of activities cap-
tured by this variable are: grocery shopping, shopping at warehouse stores (e.g.,
WalMart or Costco) and malls, doing banking, getting haircut, reading product
reviews, researching prices/availability, and online shopping.
There are three types of variables associated with the labor force status: 1.
nine categorical variables earnji where each of them represents j-th decile of
weekly labor income with the bottom decile as the referential category (Table:
A.1), 2. unemployment status (both on lay-off and looking), and 3. retirement.
To control other sources of heterogeneity I introduce some demographic vari-
ables: the (quadratic) age trend, gender (woman as reference), and race (white as
reference).
Aguiar and Hurst (2007) suggest controlling for ‘shopping needs,’ which stem
from differences in the family composition. For this reason, I add dummies in-
dicating: 1. if the respondent has a partner (both spouse and unmarried), 2.
whether the partner is unemployed, and 3. the presence of children.
9Due to the fact that there are observations with zero values, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine
function arsinh(x) = ln(x +√1 + x2) as an approximation of the logarithmic function.
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Table 1.1: Regression results
Dependent variablelog(shopping)
(I) (II) (III)
Earnings dummies (Fig. 1.1)
Retired 0.147∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Unemployed 0.302∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Male −0.484∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗ −0.470∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Age 0.007∗∗ −0.002 −0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)Age2 −0.0001∗ 0.00004 0.00005
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Black −0.151∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Single −0.125∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016)
Unemployed Partner −0.170∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018)
Child 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
Constant 1.979∗∗∗ 2.182∗∗∗ 2.217∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.073) (0.078)
Shopping needs No Yes Yes
Year and day dummies No No Yes
N 132,131 132,131 132,131
F Statistic 100.574∗∗∗ 90.876∗∗∗ 71.039∗∗∗
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Results. I estimated the model using the pooled regression. All observations
were weighted to ensure that each stratification group is correctly represented
in the population. I restricted the sample only to households aged 22-74 and ex-
cluded top-percentile households with respect to earnings and shopping. Three
specification are considered: with labor market variables only (I); with controls
for labor market status and shopping needs (II); with controls for market status,
shopping needs, and year/day dummies (III). The estimated results of model (1.1)
are presented in Table 1.1 and Figures 1.1 and 1.2. The conducted analysis leads
to the following observations on the relationship between the shopping behavior
and the labor market status:
Pattern 1 (Shopping effort and labor market status) In the ATUS 2003-2015
the following patterns are observed:
i the unemployed people spent on average exp(.321) = 37.85% more time shop-
ping than the referential earning group;
ii the retired people spent on average exp(.165) = 17.94% more time shopping
than the referential earning group;
iii top deciles of the labor earnings spent on average more time shopping than the
referential earning group.
Observation 1.i and 1.ii do not differ qualitatively from results present in the
literature. Kaplan and Menzio (2016) show that the unemployed people spend
between 13% and 20% more time on shopping than the employed. The differ-
ence obtained by Krueger and Mueller (2012) is larger and amounts to 28%. My
finding is of the same sign but is also quantitatively higher. The reason for this
can be attributed to the fact that I used the bottom decile of labor earners as the
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referential category in my study, whereas in the aforementioned articles the un-
employed are compared with the whole population of the employed. Regarding
the shopping behavior of retirees, Aguiar and Hurst (2007) compare the cell of
retirement-age10 people with households aged 25-29 and show the older spend
on average 32.7 log-points more on shopping. This effect is twice as large as
observation 1.ii. However, if instead of regressing on the quadratic age trend I
use age bins in the way Aguiar and Hurst (2007) did, then the people who are
in the oldest cell and are retired spend 30.7 log-points more on shopping. In the
further considerations I stick to estimate 1.ii, which disentangles the retirement
state from the age effect.
Patterns 1.i and 1.ii are well known and rationalized by the search for price
bargains. Householdswith low resources paymore attention to expenditures and
are more patient to get lower prices. They are able to decrease their prices by
increasing the search effort embodied by such activities as visiting more stores
for comparison shopping, clipping coupons, or waiting for sales. All of them
require some additional amount of time though. Those observations led to a
traditional view that equalizes shopping effort with the search for price bargains.
In this sense, observation 1.iii, which to the best of my knowledge is novel,
seems to be paradoxical. Conditioned on being employed, affluent households
from top deciles spend significantly more time shopping than poor households
(see Figure 1.1). Nonetheless, according to the reasoning above we should rather
observe the opposite effect11. This finding suggests that apart from price hunting
there must be another motive driving shopping effort in such a fashion that rich
people spend more time shopping. I claim that an effort accompanying the size
of consumption is a good candidate for such a motive that rationalizes fact 1.iii.
10The authors do not use an explicit dummy for the retirement state.
11In this claim I implicitly assume that leisure and consumption are normal goods.
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The argument for this is that households with a high level of consumption have
to visit more stores. Every shopping trip takes additional amount of time12.
Figure 1.1: Regression estimates for dummies of earning deciles.
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The remaining estimates of variables controlling for shopping needs are con-
sistent with the intuition. Single households spend less time shopping due to
lower variety and amount of needed consumption. Respondents with a unem-
ployed partner also spend less time on purchasing goods. This can be explained
with delegation of non-market work to unemployed members of a family, who
12Admittedly, households can purchase many units of consumption in one store. This concern
is discussed thoroughly in section IV. Without going too much into details, such a shopping
strategy of households increases the market power of retailers and makes customers captive for
a bigger fraction of purchases.
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have more time. Having children increases shopping needs too13.
Figure 1.2: Regression estimates for year and weekdays dummies.
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Last but not least, Figure 1.2 shows how the shopping effort varied over years
and weekdays. Unsurprisingly, households spend more time shopping in week-
ends. It is worth noting, there is a visible downward trend from 2003 through
2015. Every year households spent less time shopping, on average 1.28% less
every year. One reason for this phenomenon can be the profound improvement
of purchasing technology. New technologies developed recently such as online
purchases, comparison shopping engine, mobile payments, and many more may
caused the decline in the magnitude of product market frictions. Consequently,
13In an auxiliary analysis, I verified if a number of children is important. It does not seem so as
the increase of shopping time is of about 4% for every number of children (treated as dummies).
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it might have given rise to lower time required for obtaining consumption goods.
IV. A Life-Cycle Model of Shopping Effort
My framework integrates random search for consumption into a life-cycle in-
completemarketsmodelwith heterogenous agents (e.g., İmrohoroğlu, İmrohoroğlu,
and Joines, 1995; Huggett, 1996; Ríos-Rull, 1996). Household income is driven by
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Every household makes the decision about
level of savings, that are used to insure against future income fluctuations and to
smooth the future consumption. The remaining disposable resources of house-
hold are spent on consumption. On top of the economy I introduced the frictional
transactions technology. Households have to exert effort to purchase goods. This
effort has two components: 1. effort to search for price bargains, 2. purchase ef-
fort required to purchase consumption of a given size. The former accounts for
increasing probability that household during a single purchase samples a lower
price, while the latter relates to the assumption that more consumption is pos-
sible by increasing a number of purchases14. The price search is present and
documented in the literature (e.g., Kaplan and Menzio, 2016) and the purchase
effort is new and explained in more details later.
I first describe the setup of the economy. Next I characterize the model equi-
librium and present some examples to shed some light on the shopping mecha-
nism at work.
14In this regard, there is an important difference with the story of long queues with low prices
and short queues with high prices offered by the directed search (e.g.,Moen, 1997; Bai, Ríos-Rull,
and Storesletten, 2011). The recent empirical literature due to Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and
Trachter (2016); Kaplan and Menzio (2015) shows that only 15% of the variance of prices is due
to variation in the expensiveness of the stores at which a good is sold. This finding suggests to
use the random search instead.
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A. Building Blocks of the Economy
Demographics. The model period is one year. The stationary economy is popu-
lated by a continuum of households living T periods. Consumers work for Twork
periods and next go into retirement for T − Twork periods.
Preferences. Households exhibit preferences defined over stochastic sequences
of consumption and overall shopping effort {ct, ft}Tt=1 represented by the instan-
taneous utility function:
u(ct)− v(ft), (1.2)
and the discount factor β. Households are expected utility maximizers. The util-
ity from consumption,u(ct) is additively separable from the disutility from shop-
ping effort, v(ft). Both functions are assumed to be increasing and u(ct) is con-
cave while v(ft) is convex. Overall shopping effort ft is a function of two shop-
ping margins, a number of purchasesmt and search intensity st. It increases in
both margins, i.e. ∂ft∂mt > 0, ∂ft∂st > 0. Besides, both shopping margins affect each
other’s impact on ft as follows∂2ft∂st∂mt > 0. It means that higher shopping effortmt increases the marginal cost
of searching for price bargains, st, and vice versa, the higher search intensity
leads to a higher marginal cost of shopping effort.
Purchases (mt). In order to consume goods ct, households must spend some
time for visiting stores. They make many repeated purchases (shopping visits)mt in a given period. The level of the required effort is strictly increasing with
consumption. Consumers make purchases, which are matched with goods of-
fered by the retailers. Let D be the aggregate level of shopping effort (yet to
be defined) of all households, R be the total amount of consumption purveyed
by the retailers and θ = RD be the market tightness of the consumption mar-
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ket. Both sides come together through a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglass
function, M(D,R) = DαR1−α. A single shopping visit allows a household to
purchase M(D,R)D = θ1−α units of consumption. Thus, given an equilibrium mar-
ket “tightness” θ, there is a linear relationship between consumption and the
level of required shopping effort, viz.
ct = mtθ1−α. (1.3)
Figure 1.3: Matching shopping effort with retailers
High θ
Shopping behavior D
Available consumption R Low θ
Note, that the efficiency of purchase θ1−α does not necessarily have to be less
than one. This statistics tells us about the level of feasible consumption for a
single purchase15. Suppose that a household wants to consume a certain amount
of goods. In an economy with high θ she has to make fewer shopping trips to be
able to purchase it (Figure 1.3).
Price Search (st). Apart from the number of purchases (which directly trans-
lates to the level of consumption), each household makes a decision on the in-
tensity of search for price bargains, st. Suppose prices quoted by retailers are
distributed according to a cdf G(p) = Pr(x ≤ p) with a lower bound p, such
that G(p) = 0 and an exogenously16 set upper bound ζ, such that G(ζ) = 1. For
15In this regard, the interpretation of the efficiency of shopping effort differs from the proba-
bility that an unemployed worker matches with a vacancy used in the labor search literature. It
is due to the fact that consumption is intuitively divisible while jobs are not.
16The relevance of this assumption is discussed more thoroughly later.
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a single purchase the price is sampled independently. Depending on the search
intensity st, the purchase receives with probability of st two independent offers
drawn from G(p) and the lower one is paid, or with complementary probability
of 1− st one price is sampled and the customer is captive for this specific trans-
action. Thus the distribution of the effective price of a single purchase is a result
of the compound lottery:
F(p; st) = (1− st)G(p) + st (1− [1−G(p)]2) . (1.4)
The first term, (1 − st)G(p) tells us the probability that the purchase is captive
and the effective price will be lower than p, while the second term is the proba-
bility that two prices are drawn and the minimum of those offers are lower thanp17. A household can decrease the expected value of the price drawn from the
lottery by increasing its search intensity st, but on the other hand, there is a
trade-off since it increases the disutility from shopping visits18.
The cost of the consumption bundle. The price of every purchase constitut-
ing the overall shopping effort (mt) is sampled independently. It means that
the overall cost of the consumption bundle ct = mtθ1−α is the realization of
continuum of lotteries, i.e. mtθ1−α∫
0
p(i)di, (1.5)
where prices p(i) are drawn from the cdf F(p; st). Lemma 1 states that, while
the cost of a single purchase is random and ex-ante unknown, the cost of many
purchases is certain with probability one.
17Clearly, Pr(x ≥ min {p′, p′′}) = (1 − G(p))2, so the cdf of the minimum of two prices is
given by Pr(x ≤ min {p′, p′′}) = 1− [1−G(p)]2 .
18It is a consequence of assuming the positive cross partial derivative, ∂ft∂mt∂st > 0.
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Lemma 1 (Cost of consumption bundle) Let the effective price of a purchase
be distributed according to the cdf F(p; st).Then the cost of consumption ct given
search intensity converges almost surely:
mtθ1−α∫
0
p(i)di a.s.Ïmtθ1−α︸ ︷︷ ︸ct E(p|st), (1.6)
where the effective price of consumption is equal to E(p|st) = ∫ pdF(p; st).
Proof The lemma is an immediate result of applying the weak law of large num-
bers for random continuum in a version proposed byUhlig (1996, Theorem 2).
It is convenient to make a decomposition of E(p|st) to disentangle the marginal
effect of increasing search intensity on the effective price.
Lemma 2 (Linearity of the effective price function) For given distribution of
the quoted prices G(p) the effective price paid by households is a linear function
with respect to search intensity s :
E(p|st) = p0 − stMPB, (1.7)
where:
i. p0 = ∫ ζp xdG(x) is the price for the fully captive consumer;
ii. MPB = Emax{p′, p′′}−p0(≥ 0) is the marginal (price) benefit of increasing
the search intensity st, where Emax{p′, p′′} is the expected maximum of two
independent draws of prices.
Proof To derive (1.7) I use the fact that the expected value of any non-negative
random variable x distributed according to a cdf H(x) can be computed inte-
grating over its survival function (Billingsley, 1995, p. 79), namely:
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E(x) = ∞∫
0
(1−H(x))dx. (1.8)
The price of the consumption bundle is then a result of applying this property to
equation (3.11):
E(p|st) = ∞∫
0
1−G(x)− st (G(x)− [G(x)]2)dx,
where ∫∞
0
1− G(x)dx is the expected value for the captive offer and, using an
analogous reasoning from Lemma 1, is also the price of consumption for the fully
captive household that decides not to make any search for prices.
The residual part is equal to:
∞∫
0
(G(x)− [G(x)]2)dx =: MPB, (1.9)
and which is clearly always positive as ∀xG(x) ≥ [G(x)]2. For better interpre-
tation it is convenient to reformulate equation (1.9):
∞∫
0
(G(x)− [G(x)]2)dx = ∞∫
0
1− [G(x)]2dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Emax{p′,p′′}
− ∞∫
0
1−G(x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸p0
.
The expected maximum of two independent draws, max{p′, p′′} is distributed
according to [G(x)]2. It can be easily shown by the fact that Pr(max{p′, p′′} ≤x) = Pr(p′ ≤ x, p′′ ≤ x).Assuming independence of p′ and p′′ we getPr(p′ ≤x) · Pr(p′′ ≤ x) = [G(x)]2. Therefore, Emax{p′, p′′} = ∫∞
0
1 − [G(x)]2dx.
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Lemma 1 shows that thanks to the fact that the cost of consumption is a sum
of many repeated purchases the overall cost of the consumption basket can be
pinned down deterministically. Each purchase is a result of different lottery
price. Lemma 2 goes even further. It says that only two statistics of the price
distribution, p0 and MPB are needed to be known by households for making
the optimal decision.
Productivity process. While being active in the labor market (t ∈ 1, Twork)
every household faces the idiosyncratic wage risk. Log productivities follow an
exogenous stochastic process:
lnyt = κt + ηt + εt,ηt = ηt−1 + νt,
where εt ∼iid N(0, σ2ε ) and νt ∼iid N(0, σ2ν ). The deterministic part κt is a
lifecycle component common to all households. The martingale part ηt and the
serially uncorrelated part εt account for the permanent and transitory compo-
nents of the productivity, respectively. While being employed all households
receive the labor income wyt.
Retirement. Households older than Twork receive a deterministic retirement
that is a function of their income in the last working-age periodwith replacement
rate repl :
logyt = log(repl) · {κTwork + ηTwork + εTwork} .
Budget constraint. Households can hold a single risk-free asset which pays a
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net return, r. Let at+1 be the amount of asset carried over from t to t+1. Every
household faces the sequence of intertemporal budget constraints:
E(p|st)ct + at+1 ≤ wyt + (1 + r)at, ∀t∈1,T . (1.10)
The effective price of consumption is a function of search intensity and is given
by equation (1.7). It is worth noting that the intensity of search for prices s
does not affect, at least directly, the level of consumption, but only the price of
consumption. The shopping effort mt affects the cost of consumption bundle
only by the level of consumption expressed by the upper limit of the integral in
formula (1.5). In addition to this every household faces the exogenous borrowing
constraint at+1 ≥ B.
Households’ Decision Problem. The dynamic problem of a household of age t
whose state is x = (a, ε, ν, η) is:
Vt(a, ε, η) = maxc,f,m,s,p,a′ u(c)− v(f) + βEη′|ηVt+1(a′, ε′, η′) (1.11)
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s.t. pc + a′ ≤ (1 + r)a +wy,c = mθ1−α,f = f(m,s),p = p0 − sMPB,a′ ≥ B,s ∈ [0, 1],
logy =
κt + η + ε, for t ≤ Twork,log(repl) · {κTwork + ηTwork + εTwork} , for t > Twork,η′ = η + ν′,
The problem is not convex due to bilinearity in controls s and c in the bud-
get constraint. This may cause that the first order conditions do not suffice and
might lead to local solutions. However, this issue is solved by using envelope
convexification of the bilinear constraint, which was proposed by McCormick
(1976).
Retailers’ problem. Sellers buy consumption goods at the cost standardized
to one and quotes her price in every period conditioned on being matched with
households’ purchases. She maximizes the sales revenue:
S(p) = θ−α T∑t=1
∫ θ1−αmt(x)(1 + st(x))D
(
1− 2st(x)
1 + st(x)G(p)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
BusinessStealing
(p − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus
Appropriation
dµt(x),
(1.12)
where µt(x) is the distribution of households of age t over the individual states
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x = (a, ε, ν, η). In the problem of sellers there are two opposite motives. First,
the net revenue (p−1) from a single purchase is increasingwith the set price. The
second motive is generated by lack of information whether the matched buyer
has the alternative offer for this purchase. The probability that the household
has an alternative that with a better price than p amounts to 2st(x)
1+st(x)G(p).Thus,
the probability of acceptance a given price price is the complementary event
with probability
(
1− 2st(x)
1+st(x)G(p)) . Higher prices decrease the probability that
the offer will be accepted by the buyer. Thus, these two motive can generate
a price dispersion, in which there are retailers that have higher markups but
their prices are rejected more often and retailers that cut their prices to increase
the probability of the successful transaction. In an equilibrium the sellers are
indifferent19.
Relevance of exogenous reservation price ζ. A question that arises from the
exogenous price ζ is about the commitment of households to pay sampled prices
for all purchases. The repeated purchases can be interpreted as consumption in
different subperiods of the year. If the subperiods are long enough it is reason-
able to say that households agree to pay the lowest offered (but still high) price
in order to avoid starving to death due to the lack of consumption. On the other
hand, if subperiods are short enough households might prefer setting their own
endogenous reservation price p and deferring from paying above this price. In
this case, the model should be augmented by an additional control, p. However,
this extensions leads to some issues. First, lemma 2 does not hold and the con-
straint for the effective price is not linear with all controls. This is due to the
fact that p replaces exogenous ζ. Second, there is no clear distinction between
two motives, shopping effortmt and search intensity st anymore. An additional
19In this sense, the mechanism is similar to the theory of homogenous hotel rooms with dif-
ferent prices given by Prescott (1975).
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increase in shopping effort accompanied by a decrease in p plays the same role
as an increase in s20.
Equilibrium. Having outlined the building blocks of the economy, I am in the
position to define an equilibrium of the economy.
Definition 3 (Rational Stationary Equilibrium) A stationary equilibrium is
a sequence of consumption and shopping plans {ct(x),mt(x), st(x)}Tt=1, and the
distribution of quoted pricesG(p) and paid pricesF(p; st(x)), distribution of house-
holds µt(x) and interest rate r such that:
1. ct(x),mt(x), st(x) are optimal given r, w, G(p), B, and θ;
2. individual and aggregate behavior are consistent:
D = T∑t=1
∫
(1 + st(x))mt(x)dµt(x); (1.13)
3. retailers post prices p to maximize the sales revenues taking as given house-
holds’ behavior;
4. the private savings sum up to an exogenous aggregate level K :
T∑
t=1
∫ at(x)dµt(x) = K; (1.14)
5. G(p) and F(p; st(x)) are consistent given the household distribution µt(x);
6. µt(x) is consistent with the consumption and shopping policies.
20However, search intensity st is still necessary for generating price dispersion.
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B. Characterization of the Equilibrium
The dispersed distribution of posted prices is consistent with the solution to the
maximization of the retailers’ net sales revenue, (1.12). Lemma 4 presents prop-
erties of an equilibrium of this kind. The proof of the lemma is similar to ones
used in Burdett and Judd (1983) and Kaplan and Menzio (2016).
Lemma 4 (Characterization of the Equilibrium Price Dispersion) The c.d.f.G(p) exhibits following properties:
i. G(p) is continuous.
ii. supp G(p) is a connected set.
iii. the highest price charged by retailers is equal to ζ,
iv. all retailers yield the same profit, ∀p∈supp G(p)S(p) = S∗,
where supp G(p) is the smallest closed set whose complement has probability zero.
Proof The two first properties are an immediate result of Lemma 1 from (Burdett
and Judd, 1983). Suppose thatG(p) has a discontinuity at some p′ ∈ supp G(p).
The retailer posting an infinitesimally smaller price p′ − ε would increase its
profit as the probability of making a sale would change by a discrete amount.
Furthermore, supp G(p) is a connected set. Suppose there is a gap of zero prob-
ability between p′ and p′′. The seller’s gain would be strictly higher at p′′ asp′′ > p′, and G(p′) = G(p′′).This cannot occur in an equilibrium.
Next, suppose that (iii) is not true. Then max supp G(p) =: p ≤ ζ.21 More-
over, we know that G(p) = G(ζ) = 1. If we substitute values of the c.d.f. for
both prices into (1.12) all firms will have incentives to set higher price for higher
21Recall that there is the exogenous upper-bound for prices ζ, so p ≥ ζ is not considered.
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demand, which leads us to contradiction. As a result, max supp G(p) = ζ. Fact
(iv) is an equilibrium condition. If there would be such a price p that would yield
higher profit, each individual retailer would have incentives to set this price.
It is convenient to decompose the aggregate shopping effort D defined in
(1.13) into two components:
Ψ(−) :=
T∑
t=1
∫ mt(x)(1− st(x))dµt(x), (1.15)
Ψ(+) :=
T∑
t=1
∫ mt(x)2st(x)dµt(x), (1.16)
D = T∑t=1
∫ mt(x)(1 + st(x))dµt(x) = Ψ(−) +Ψ(+). (1.17)
Notice that Ψ(−) in (1.15) is an aggregate measure of visits where customers are
captive and Ψ(+) in (1.16) where households draw two prices and choose the
lower one. D from (1.17) is the measure of the aggregate shopping defined in
(1.13) and is a sum ofΨ(−) andΨ(+). Consequently, Ψ(−)D and Ψ(+)D are probabilities
that a single draw is captive or matched with an alternative offer, respectively.
By construction all offers of Ψ(−) are effective for the reason that buyers are
captive during these purchases. On the other hand, only half of Ψ(+)D is accepted
by buyers and the remaining part is rejected. It is so because for this measure of
offers consumers get two price offers and choose the lower one.
Properties from Lemma 4 can be used to derive the formula for an equilibrium
price dispersion.
Theorem 5 (Equilibrium Price Dispersion) Given aggregate statistics of house-
holds’ shopping decisions {Ψ(−),Ψ(+), D}, (where Ψ(−),Ψ(+) > 0), the equilib-
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rium price dispersion can be expressed in a closed form:
G(p) =

0, for p < p,
D
Ψ(+)
− Ψ(−)
Ψ(+)
· ζ−1p−1 , for p ∈ [p, ζ],
1, for p > ζ,
(1.18)
where the lower bound of suppG(p) is:
p = Ψ(+)D + Ψ(−)D ζ. (1.19)
Proof The proof is relegated to Appendix II.
Discussion of Theorem 5. Given p, the equilibrium price dispersion G(p) is
a linear function decreasing in: 1. the inverse odds ratio22 of being matched
with a non-captive customer,
(
Ψ(+)
Ψ(−)
)−1 and 2. the probability that a visiting
buyer draws an alternative offer, Ψ(+)D . Suppose that there are two economies
with the same aggregate shopping effort D and different level of search inten-
sity, Ψ′(+) > Ψ′′(+). Due to the fact that ∂G(p)∂Ψ(+)D > 0 for every p from the theinterior of supp G(p), the price lottery of the economy with higher search in-
tensityΨ′(+) first-order stochastically dominates the price lottery of the economy
with lower search intensityΨ′′(+).This observation leads to an immediate remark
that economies with higher search intensity exhibit the lower expected value of
the price lottery. The result is consistent with economic intuition. The higher
fraction of buyers with alternative offers is, the stronger competition between re-
tailers is observed. For a better understanding how the price equilibrium changes
in Ψ(+) consider three cases:
22Notice that Ψ(+)Ψ(−) =
Ψ(+)D
1−Ψ(+)D .
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1. Ψ(+) = 0 – the business stealingmotive from (1.12) embodied by
(
1− 2st(x)
1+st(x)G(p))
disappears and only the surplus appropriation motive occurs. Every cus-
tomer is captive and this leads to a degenerate Diamond (1971)-type equi-
librium, where all retailers charge the monopolistic price, ζ;
2. Ψ(+) = D (hypothetical) – every consumer draws two prices and chooses
the lower one. Consequently, all retailers start playing a Bertrand game
and the only price equilibrium is a degenerate competitive one, p = 1.
Nonetheless, it is a purely hypothetical case since an equilibrium fromDef-
inition (3) with Ψ(+) = D never exists. If all prices are set competitively,
then none of households have incentives to make any search. To them it
pays off to be captive all the time but thenΨ(−) = D andΨ(+) ̸= D,which
contradicts the constituting assumption of the case that Ψ(+) = D;
3. Ψ(+) ∈ (0, D) – there occurs a tug of war between two motives, 1. the ap-
propriation of consumers’ surplus and 2. business stealing. In every point
of the support of the equilibrium price dispersion supp G(p) = [p, ζ] re-
tailers yield the same profit S∗. However, for each price there is a differ-
ent composition of sources of this profit. The business stealing motive is
the only motive for retailers charging p, while the surplus appropriation
only rationalizes the behavior of sellers that set ζ. Prices from the interior
of supp G(p) are supported by a combination of both. As the aggregate
search Ψ(+)D increases, retailers set lower prices and the lowest quoted price,p gets closer to the competitive pricing.
The lower bound p of supp G(p) also depends on the aggregate search intensity
in the economy. Interestingly, it is a convex combination of the competitive price
(normalized to 1) and the monopolistic price ζ,where Ψ(+)D and Ψ(−)D are weights.
The higher Ψ(+)D is, the further p is from the monopolistic price and closer to the
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Figure 1.4: The equilibrium support of G(p).
Ψ(−)D (ζ − 1) Ψ(+)D (ζ − 1)
1 p ζ
competitive price (see Figure 1.4).
Equilibrium price moments. Finally, p0 and Emax{p′, p′′} from Lemma 2 can
be pinned down using the closed form solution fromTheorem 5.
Proposition 6 Given households’ aggregate shopping efforts Ψ(−) and Ψ(+), the
price for captive customers (p0) and the expected maximum of two independent
draws (Emax{p′, p′′}) can be expressed in a closed form:
i. price of the captive customer:
p0 = p + Ψ(−)
Ψ(+)
(ζ − 1) log(ζ − 1p − 1
)
+
(
1− D
Ψ(+)
)(ζ − p) ; (1.20)
ii. the expected maximum of two independent draws:
Emax{p′, p′′} =ζ − ( D
Ψ(+)
)2
(ζ − p) + 2DΨ(−)
Ψ2(+)
(ζ − 1) log(ζ − 1p − 1
)−
− (Ψ(−)
Ψ(+)
)2
(ζ − p)ζ − 1p − 1 .
Proof The proof is relegated to Appendix II.
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Figure 1.5: Moments of equilibrium price distribution and the aggregate search
intensity.
Ψ(+)D
1
ζ
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p0suppG(p)
Emin{p′, p′′}
E(p|s)
Note: The figure depicts summary shopping moments for Ψ(+)D ∈ [0, 1).
The moments from Proposition 6 are “sufficient” price statistics23 that are re-
quired in the household’s problem (1.11). For gaining a better insight into the
mechanics of the equilibrium it is helpful to conduct the comparative statics
with respect to the search intensity. Without loss of generality, in this exer-
cise I focus on the representative consumer framework. For this case there is
a one-to-one mapping between the individual search intensity of the consumer
and the aggregate search intensity, i.e. Ψ(+)D = 2s1+s 24. Figure 1.5 shows how
23Recall thatMPB = Emax{p′, p′′} − p0.
24Besides, notice that in this case the equilibrium cdf is distributed according toG(p) = 1+s2s −
32
the key price characteristics change in the probability of being matched with a
non-captive customer, Ψ(+)D . First, the average effective price E(p|s) varies be-
tween the price of the fully captive customer p0 and the expected minimum of
two draws Emin{p′, p′′}. Even though prices are sampled from a whole interval
supp G(p) = [p, ζ], the (unit) cost of the consumption bundle is the average
price E(p|s) drawn from F(p) and given by (1.7). As mentioned before, for
Ψ(+) = 0 there exists only the degenerate Diamond (1971)-type equilibrium,
where E(p|s) = p0 = ζ. An increase in Ψ(+)D makes E(p|s) further from the
captive price p0 and closer to the expected minimum Emin{p′, p′′}. In the limit
case you can observe25:
lims→1− E(p|s) = 2p0 − Emax{p′, p′′} = Emin{p′, p′′}. (1.21)
Higher search intensity in the economy fosters higher competition between re-
tailers. As a result, all price statistics (p0, Emin{p′, p′′},Emax{p′, p′′},E(p|s))
tend towards the competitive solution, which in themodel is normalized to unity.
A natural concern that arises here is the assumption on the exogeneity of the
upper bound ζ of suppG(p).Theminimum price quoted by retailers responds to
the level of search intensity, while the maximum price is constant all the time.
However, it is not a problem. As Figure 1.6.a shows top percentiles decrease
in search intensity. Effective price (E(p|s) in Figure 1.6.b) decreases even faster.
For instance, 97th percentile in a low search economy is close to the upper bound,ζ. In fact, the whole support is concentrated in this neighborhood. On the con-
trary, the same percentile is much closer to the competitive price in a high search
1−s
2s ζ−1p−1 . Only the search intensity s matters, while the number of purchasesm cancels out. Inthe heterogenous-agent framework it is analogous. The latter margin plays only a weighting role
for purchases made by various households.
25Note max{p′, p′′} = p′+p′′2 + |p′ − p′′| and min{p′, p′′} = p′+p′′2 − |p′ − p′′|. Then
Emin{p′, p′′}+ Emax{p′, p′′} = Ep′ + Ep′′ = 2p0, which gives the latter equality in (1.21).
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economy. This observation is true especially for the paid prices (Figure 1.6.b). In
fact, in spite of the exogeneity of ζ, prices paid by consumers can be successfully
reduced by increasing search intensity, s.
Figure 1.6: The equilibrium price dispersion for the different aggregate search
intensities, Ψ(+)D .
(a) Distribution of quoted prices
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Solution to the household’s problem. Finally, I am in the position to write the
first order conditions that constitute the solution to the households’ problem
(1.11). The intertemporal decision is determined by:
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u′(c)θ(1−α) − v ′(f) ∂f∂mp0 − sMPB ≥ β(1 + r)Ex′|xu′(c′)θ(1−α) − v ′(f ′) ∂f
′∂m′p0 − s′MPB , (1.22)
and a′ ≥ B, with complementary slackness. The main departure from the
textbook Euler equation is the additional convex cost, v(ft) and varying price,p = p0 − sMPB, which is a function of the control, s in the considered case.
For the CRRA specification the household makes also an intratemporal decision
on its shopping behavior:
m ≥
 θ(1−σ)(1−α)(1+s
1−s )ϕ
(
1 + 2p0
(1−s)MPB
)
1σ+ϕ
(1.23)
and s ≥ 0,with complementary slackness26. First, as in the standard model, con-
sumption goes along with the level of wealth. By construction, it affects mt in
the sameway due to the linear relationship, ct = mtθ1−α. Second, both shopping
margins are Frisch complements to each other in the disutility function. Conse-
quently, households with higher consumption exert lower search for prices, st.
There is also a certain number of purchases m0 (which translates directly intoc0 = m0θ1−α), above which households decide to be captive in every purchase,
E(p|s = 0) = p0 (see Figure 1.7 ). However, as mentioned before it does not
make them to pay ζ all the time because there is a positive externality generated
by households with high search. This is embodied by p0 < ζ.
26Condition (1.23) is not defined in s = 1. However, the assumed functional specification
meets an Inada-like condition, lims→1− v(mt , st) = ∞, which guarantees that such a search
intensity is never chosen.
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Figure 1.7: Optimal relationship between the number of purchases (mt), price
search (st) and the effective consumption price E(p|s).
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V. Taking the Model to Data
In this section I present my strategy for parametrization of themodel and compu-
tation of the equilibrium. Model parameters are divided into two groups. Values
of the first group (Table 1.2) are preset exogenously to standard values drawn
from the literature. Values of crucial parameters which account for the shopping
technology (Table 1.4) are determined internally using the method of simulated
moments.
Demographics. Themodel is annual. Households enter the labormarketwhen
they are 25, they retire at age of 60 and die at age 90. This implies Twork = 35
and T = 65.
Preferences. The preferences over consumption are represented by a CRRA
specification, u(c) = c1−σ
1−σ . The elasticity of relative risk aversion parameter 1σ
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was set to .5.The disutility from overall shopping effort is modeled by an isoe-
lastic function:
v(f) =

f1+ϕ
1+ϕ , for t ∈ 1, . . . , Twork,χret f1+ϕ
1+ϕ , for t ∈ Twork + 1, . . . , T. (1.24)
Factor χret(< 1) is supposed to capture a lower opportunity cost of shopping
time for the retired consumers. The function of overall shopping effort f is chosen
tomeet assumptions on increasing in bothmargins andmutual complementarity.
It is represented by a functional specification f = 1+s
1−sm. Besides this form is
convenient in the computational procedure, which is described and explained
more carefully in the end of the section. Finally the discount factor β was chosen
to replicate an aggregate wealth-income ratio of 2.5.
Interest rate and assets. I calibrate the discount factor β to generate an ag-
gregate wealth-income ratio of 2.5. Following the RBC literature (Cooley and
Prescott, 1995), the interest rate r was set to .04. Household debt contributes
very little to wealth distribution. In aggregate it poses less than 1% of the total
wealth and a median quarterly credit limit reported by households from the SCF
amounts to merely 74% of quarterly labor income, which is not much in com-
parison to the mean net worth equal to over 900% of the labor income. For this
reason, I assume households can save but cannot borrow, B = 0 as modeled in
Carroll (1997) or more recently in Krueger, Mitman, and Perri (2016). The sales
tax, τc was set to the average US sales tax.
Income process. The income process is a combination of two components,
transitory {εt} and permanent {ηt}. Following the literature, the log variances
of those shocks were set to σ2ε = .05, σ2η = .01.The age-dependent deterministic
component, κt is approximated by a quadratic regression using the PSID data as
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in Kaplan and Violante (2010). In retirement, households receive a social secu-
rity income payment that is a function of their income in the last working-age
period with replacement rate repl (Guvenen and Smith, 2014; Berger, Guerrieri,
Lorenzoni, and Vavra, 2015).
Table 1.2: External choices
Parameter Interpretation Value SourceTwork Age of retirement 35 –T Length of life 65 –σ Risk aversion 2.0 –repl Retirement replacement rate .45 Guvenen and Smith (2014)σ2ε Variance of the transitory shock .05 Kaplan and Violante (2010)σ2η Variance of the permanent shock .01 Kaplan and Violante (2010)r Interest rate .04 Cooley and Prescott (1995)τcons Consumption tax .08454 Reutersκt Deterministic life-cycle income profile – Kaplan and Violante (2010)B Borrowing constraint 0 –
Shopping parameters. The key shopping parameters are determined inter-
nally using a simulated method of moments. There are six parameters to be
pinned down: the discount factor (β), curvature of the disutility from shopping
(ϕ), matching efficiency of a single purchase27 (θ1−α), wage (w), the maximum
price quoted by retailers (ζ), and lower disutility from shopping of retired house-
holds (χret). The quantitative behavior of the model is disciplined by seven in-
ternal targets, which can divided into three categories: shopping effort, price
dispersion and aggregate state. The calibration consists in simulating artificial
27Admittedly, θ is an equilibrium object. However, it is easy to show that every θ1−α can be
rationalized either by fixing the measure of consumption available in aggregate or by setting a
fixed entry cost for retailers. In partial equilibrium both approaches are tantamount. Rationaliza-
tion with a fixed entry cost is used in a work-in-progress paper that studies shopping in general
equilibrium (Kaplan and Pytka, 2016).
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panels of data for shopping economies and the final parametrization is chosen to
set values of simulated moments as close as possible to their empirical counter-
parts.
Shopping effort. The shopping effort targets are matched using indirect in-
ference (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault, 1993). First, I estimate an auxiliary
regression model using the ATUS data, which captures the empirical findings
1.i-iii presented in Section III:
log shoppingi = α+βearn 23+i +δuunempi+δrretiri+δaAgei+γXi+εi,
(1.25)
where earn 23+i is a dummy accounting for the top labor income tertile. In this
regard, one single dummy variable replaces nine dummies (∑j βjearnji) of the
baseline specification (1.1). This change makes calibration more straightforward
and at the same time not much information is lost28. Table 1.3 shows the results
of the estimation. The regression of the reduced specification exhibits estimated
values that are similar to the baseline version. Finally, estimates of variables
associated with retirement, age, and being in the top earning tertile were used
for disciplining the structural model.
Price dispersion. In the parametrized model I want to capture certain cross-
sectional price characteristics of the US economy. For this reason, I targeted two
price differentials: 1. between high earners and low earners, 2. between em-
ployed and retired. Both moments were observed by Aguiar and Hurst (2007).
The authors using scanner data showed that retirement-age households pay on
average 3.9 percent less than young households and that households earning
more than $70,000 a year pay 2.1 percent more than households earning less
28Recall that only top deciles of the earnings spend more time shopping.
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Table 1.3: Coefficients of interest for the auxiliary model
log(shopping)
Retired 0.245∗∗∗
(0.035)
Unemployed 0.368∗∗∗
(0.031)
Age 0.0005
(0.003)earn 2
3+
0.110∗∗∗
(0.017)
Shopping needs Yes
Year and day dummies Yes
Demographic controls Yes
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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than $30,000 a year. These moments are differences in average prices paid by
households with different characteristics. In the model this is embodied by het-
erogeneity in price search intensity, s amongst households. Consequently, this
gives rise to variety in average prices, E(p|s). Apart from heterogeneity in first
moments I use also range statistics of prices paid by households. Kaplan and
Menzio (2016) used the same dataset as Aguiar and Hurst (2007) to measure price
ranges of transactions for various goods and markets. They observed that the av-
erage 90-to-10 percentile ratio of paid prices varies between 1.7 and 2.6. The
heterogeneity in marginal cost, which is not present in the model, is very likely
to contribute to a higher price dispersion29. Thus, similarly to the aforemen-
tioned paper I decide to target the price ratio of 1.7. It is noteworthy that the
authors use the consumer panel dataset which collects data on prices of effec-
tive transactions. This observation has an important implication as it means the
percentile ratio should be computed not from the distribution of prices set by
retailers, G(p), but rather the distribution of prices accepted by households30.
Computation. An equilibrium allocation and equilibrium prices are deter-
mined by solutions to the household’s dynamic problem (1.11) given prices set
by retailers and solutions to the retailer’s problem (1.12) given households’ con-
sumption and shopping decisions. The allocation is computed iteratively. The
household’s problem is solved given an initial guess on pricing strategy of re-
tailers. Then, the retailer’s problem is solved given the solution from the previ-
ous step. Next, the pricing strategy of retailers is updated and used for solving
the household’s problem. The process is repeated until convergence to a fixed
point, in which the household’s decisions generate the retailers’ pricing and vice
29This conjecture relies on theoretical results about the impact of firm productivity differentials
on the wage dispersion (e.g., Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Mortensen, 2003).
30In aggregate they are distributed according to (1 − Ψ(+)D )G(p) + Ψ(+)D [1 − (1 − G(p))2],
where Ψ(+)D is the probability that a transaction is non-captive.
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Table 1.4: Calibration targets and model values
Target Data Value Source Model Value
Shopping effort:
Shopping time of retired
relative to the referential group 1.245 This paper 1.251
Shopping time of the top earn. tercile
relative to the referential group 1.11 This paper 1.112
Age trend for shopping time 0 This paper .010
Price dispersion:
95thdecile/5thdecile of paid prices 1.7 Kaplan and Menzio (2016) 1.369
Price differential between high earners
and low earners .021 Aguiar and Hurst (2007) .011
Price differential between retirees
and working-age households -.039 Aguiar and Hurst (2007) -.051
Aggregate state:
Aggregate wealth-income ratio 2.5 Kaplan and Violante (2010) 2.498
versa. The algorithm is intuitive and relatively fast (it takes 10-15 iterations to
converge). A drawback of this approach is a risk of computing a degenerate Di-
amond (1971)-type equilibrium31. Given a “wrong” initial guess the alghorithm
might converge to an allocation where all households want to exert the maxi-
mum search intensity, s = 1. In response to this all retailers set monopolistic
prices, p = ζ, and in the next iteration all households become captive all the
time, s = 0. The decision to make the minimum price search effort supports
degenerate pricing, p = ζ, in subsequent iterations. Nonetheless, this problem
can be tackled by imposing an Inada-like assumption, lims→1− v(mt, st) = ∞,
which guarantees that a search intensity (s = 1) is never chosen by any house-
31In a companion paper I show that this type of equilibrium is unstable for this model setup
(Pytka, 2016). This property stays in contrast with the classical model of search for consumption
due to Burdett and Judd (1983).
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Table 1.5: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Descriptionϕ .104 curvature of disutility from shoppingθ1−α .113 matching efficiencyw 14.041 wageζ 84.605 maximum priceχret .588 lower disutility from shopping for retireesβ .951 discount factor
hold. The functional specification (f = 1+s
1−sm together with (1.24)) used in the
calibration meets this condition.
Calibration results. The parameter values are presented in Table 3.4 and the
targeted data moments with their model counterparts are summarized in Ta-
ble 1.4. The model matches the shopping effort statistics and the aggregate
wealth-income ratio very well. On the other hand, the price range and the price
differential between high earners and low earners are too low while the price
differential between retirees and working-age households is slightly overesti-
mated. However, in the calibration there are seven targets and six parameters,
so the system of targeted moments is overdetermined. It makes exact identifi-
cation impossible. Overall, the simulated moments are pretty close to the data
targets.
VI. Price Dispersion(s) at Play
In the equilibrium allocation the price dispersion can be characterized in four
dimensions, that is:
i. the distribution of prices quoted by retailers,
ii. the distribution of prices accepted by households,
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iii. the distribution of prices of individual purchases for a household exerting a
certain search intensity, st(x),
iv. the distribution of average prices paid by households with different search
intensities st(x) distributed according to the distribution of types given byµt(x).
Table 1.6 presents moments of the equilibrium price dispersion for the calibrated
version of the model. Aggregate search intensity is equal to Ψ(+)D = .271. From
retailers’ perspective this number can be interpreted as the probability that a
visiting customer received an alternative offer from another retailer. This prob-
ability constitutes the equilibrium price dispersion given by (3.2). Consequently,
the offered prices are a connected set [p, ζ], where the equilibrium lower boundp amounts to about 70% of the monopolistic price. If a seller is matched with
a consumer who is also matched with a lower alternative price, then the offer
with the higher price is rejected. Only offers of measure Ψ(+)
2D = .1355 drawn
with an alternative competitive offer come into force. As a result, 86.45% offers32
quoted by retailers are accepted, while the complementary 13.55% is rejected.
The accepted offers are distributed according to:(
1− Ψ(+)D
)G(p) + Ψ(+)D {1− [1−G(p)]2} . (1.26)
Both distributions, quoted prices and accepted prices, are depicted in Figure 1.8.
Intuitively, lower prices have higher probability for being accepted by customers.
This property is embodied by the fact thatG(p) is first-order stochastically dom-
inated by formula (1.26).
Given the distribution of prices quoted by retailers, households decide on
their individual search intensity, s. Consequently, every consumer draws prices
32This number is a sum of 13.55% offers matched with competitors with higher prices and
72.9% transactions with captive customers.
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Table 1.6: Moments of the Equilibrium Price Dispersion
Moment Value Description
Price moments:p/ζ .703 Min-max ratio of quoted prices
Ψ(+)/D .271 Aggregate searchp0/ζ .851 Captive price-max ratioMPB/p0 .052 Marginal price benefits
Shopping moments:
Es .201 Average search intensity
E(s|s > 0) .683 Average price search conditionedon being non-captive
Figure 1.8: Distribution of quoted and accepted prices.
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from her individual price lottery generated by equation (3.11), which is illus-
trated in Figure 1.9. Households with low search intensity sample prices from a
price lottery with a higher expected value. Recall that a consumption bundle, c
consists of continuum of shopping lotteries. Thanks to Lemma 1 the overall cost
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of consumption is pinned down deterministically. Therefore, the cost of a unit
of consumption belongs to an interval, (p0−MPB,p0]. Households that decide
to be captive in every purchase (s = 0) pay p0, while consumers with positive
search intensity (s > 0) spend p0 − sMPB on every unit of consumption. In
the limit case, for s = 1 they would pay the minimum possible price p0−MPB,
which is equal to the expected minimum from two draws33, Emin{p′, p′′}.The
fact that retailers cannot distinguish between captive and non-captive transac-
tions, the expected value of a single draw (p0) is 15.5% lower than the monopo-
listic pricing. The marginal price benefit from increasing search intensity allows
to reduce prices up to 5.2% compared with prices paid by captive customers, p0.
Figure 1.9: Individual price lotteries.
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The equilibrium price dispersion characterizing the economy is supported
33However this shopping strategy is never chosen for the assumed utility function. In the
calibrated economymaximum effort is set to s = .979 for the employed households and s = .998
for the retirees.
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Table 1.7: Captive and non-captive households
Type of households Non-captive Captive E(s|s > 0)
Working-age .129 .871 .417
Retired .485 .515 .765
Overall .293 .707 .683
by non-captive households that exert positive price search intensity (s > 0). As
shown in Table 1.7, less than 30% households decide to make some search ef-
fort to draw (with some probability) two prices. Households exerting a positive
price search effort draw two prices and choose the lower one with the probability
of 68.3%. Interestingly, if households are broke down into two groups, those in
the working-age and retirees, then it turns out that more than half of retirees and
merely 12.9% of workers are non-captive. In intensivemargins there is also a sub-
stantial difference. The average search intensity of non-captive retirees equals
to 76.5%, whilst the average search intensity of non-captive amounts to 41.7%.
This result stems directly from lower opportunity cost modeled by χret . Finally,
the last type of price dispersion, heterogeonous average prices are generated by
different search intensities, presented in Figure 1.10.
VII. Deconstructing the Aggregate Consumption
The aggregate demand generated by artificial economies is characterized us-
ing two alternative approaches, consumption responses to idiosyncratic income
shocks and cross-sectional distributions of households’ decisions (consumption
expenditures) and endogenous states (net wealth positions). All results stem
from simulating the invariant distribution of two versions of the economy, the
standard incomplete-markets model without frictions in the purchasing tech-
nology (SIM) and the incomplete-markets economy augmented with the search
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Figure 1.10: Distribution of average prices for non-captive households.
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friction described in Section IV. Both economies are calibrated to replicate the
same level of aggregate savings (wealth-income ratio of 2.5). The remaining non-
shopping parameters are set at the same level for both models (see Table 1.2).
Next, simulated statistics are compared with their empirical counterparts. It is
worth pointing out that none of statistics presented in this section were used in
the calibration procedure. In this sense, results of this section provide natural
yardsticks to measure which model is better for the quantitative analysis.
A. Consumption Responses to Shocks
To study consumption responses to income shocks I employ an identification
strategy proposed by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008). The authors, using
data on non-durable consumption from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and
making imputations basing on food demand estimates from the Consumer Ex-
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penditure Survey, assessed the transmission of income shocks into consumption.
To this end they used the log-linear approximation of the Euler equation and run
the regression:
∆ ln cit = α +MPCεεit +MPCηηit + ξit, (1.27)
where MPCε and MPCη are the pass-through coefficients of income shocks
into consumption. Intuitively, they can be interpreted as marginal propensity to
consume out of different types of shocks, permament (η) and transitory (ε).
In the data the distinction between different types of shocks is difficult. The
authors offer an estimator of MPC that is consistent under two assumptions:
short history dependences and no advanced information. This estimator is as
follows:
M̂PCx = cov(∆(pitcit), g(xit))var(g(xit)) , (1.28)
where:
g(εit) = ∆yi,t+1, g(ηit) = ∆yi,t−1 +∆yi,t +∆yi,t+1.
It is worth presenting values of the coefficients for some notable examples:
1. complete markets (with separable labor supply): MPCε = MPCη = 0
– households are able to smooth the marginal utility of consumption fully
and all shocks are insured away,
2. autarky with no storage technology: MPCε = MPCη = 1,
3. the classical version of the permanent income-life cycle model: MPCη =
1 and the response to transitory shocksMPCε depends on the time hori-
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zon. For a long horizon it should be very small and close to zero, while for
a short horizon it tends to one.
In their empirical study Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) documented
that on average 64% of permanent shocks are translated directly into consump-
tion. Kaplan and Violante (2010) applied an analogous procedure to an artifi-
cial panel generated from a calibrated version of the life-cycle SIM model. In
their simulation they reported that in the artificial economy between 78 and 93%
of permanent shocks are passed on consumption, depending on the borrowing
limit.
In the shopping economy I depart from the law of one price so the price
component is not constant and does not cancel out. Hence, I have to modify the
baseline specification to the following form:
∆ ln(pitcit) = α +MPCεεit +MPCηηit + ξit. (1.29)
I estimate equation (1.29) using artificial panels of two versions of the economies
and I compare the results with the empirical counterparts. Table 1.8 presents the
obtained estimates. In the shopping economy average consumption responses
are smoother and are closer to the empirical counterparts than in the SIM econ-
omy without product market-frictions. This phenomenon can be explained by
the fact that marginal disutility for the shopping effort partially offsets utility
of consumption, which makes consumption responses smoother. This effect in-
creases in the level of consumption, which is conformed by the values of the
pass-through coefficients for different wealth groups depicted in Figure 1.11. The
interesting implication of the model is also higher heterogeneity in consumption
responses. Households with low wealth exhibit similar willingness to consume
in both economies In the presence of the shopping friction they are even slightly
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higher since households decide to search less intensively for lower prices in re-
sponse to permanent shocks. The discrepancy between two economies is larger
for consumers from the wealthiest groups. For those households the cost of ob-
taining additional units of consumption is so high that they detain from consum-
ing more.
Table 1.8: BPPMPC
Economy M̂PCη M̂PCε
USA (BPP 2008) .64 .05
Shopping .602 .152
SIM .8 .280
Figure 1.11: Distribution of MPCs.
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B. Cross-sectional Distribution
The cross-sectional distributions of consumption expenditures and net wealth
are another dimension describing the aggregate demand. For this exercise I gen-
erate simulated moments from both artificial economies and compare with data.
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Following the macroeconomic literature of inequalities (e.g., Castañeda, Díaz-
Giménez, and Ríos-Rull, 2003; Krueger, Mitman, and Perri, 2016), distributions
are compared with the use of Gini indices and share of the total value held by
chosen groups of households. The data counterparts were calculated using the
2006 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. I focus on households aged
between 25 and 90 tomake computed statistics compatible with the calibration of
the models. Following Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) I dropped
observations with extremely high net wealth (>$ 20 millions). In the theoreti-
cal framework I do not model the household decision to purchase durables, so I
focus on non-durables and services.
Table 1.9: Consumption (expenditure) distribution
Quintile Top Percentiles
Economy Gini First Second Third Fourth Fifth 90-95 95-99 99-100
USA (PSID 2006) .353 .051 .113 .165 .224 .440 .087 .088 .121
Shopping .402 .053 .112 .163 .208 .457 .073 .061 .200
SIM .234 .100 .150 .190 .235 .330 .083 .078 .025
Table 1.9 presents the distributions of consumption expenditures in both
economies and observed in the data. The shopping economy mirrors inequal-
ities remarkably better than the SIM economy without product-market frictions.
The Gini indices for consumption in the baseline SIM and in the shopping econ-
omy amount to .234 and .401 , respectively. The empirical counterpart computed
from the PSID is equal to .353. This effect is generated mainly by groups exerting
high search for price bargains, households with low consumption and retirees.
First, households with low consumption search more intensively, which leads
to lower effective prices paid by them. Consequently, the fraction of aggregate
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consumption expenditures is smaller than in the benchmark SIMmodel. Second,
a drop in consumption expenditures after retirement is higher in the shopping
economy as can be seen in Table 1.10. This result is generated by the lower op-
portunity cost of time for retirees and is consistent with findings made by Aguiar
and Hurst (2005, 2007).
Table 1.10: Gini consumption: working-age households vs retirees
Economy Gini working-age Gini retirees overall Gini E(pc|retired)E(pc|working)
USA (PSID, 2006) .330 .383 .353 .701
Shopping .380 .381 .402 .742
SIM .214 .243 .235 .809
The distributions of net wealth are presented in Table 1.11. As can be seen
the shopping friction amplifies the wealth inequalities as well. The Gini indices
in the baseline SIM and in the shopping economy amount to .569 and .667 , re-
spectively. The empirical counterpart computed from the PSID is equal to .771.
If we look at the fine print, the higher Gini index comes from the higher share
of the total wealth held by the top quintile. In the shopping economy house-
holds from the top quintile own nearly 70% of total wealth, while in the data
82.6% is observed. In the SIM model only 55% is owned by households from the
top quintile. The improvement in this moments is generated in the analogous
way to consumption responses from the previous subsection. For this group of
households increasing the current consumption is too costly. Instead it is benefi-
cial to them to save more and increase consumption during retirement when the
opportunity cost of time is lower. There is still discrepancy between inequalities
generated by the shopping economy and observed in data. Admittedly, there
are models outperform the shopping economy in this regard. Nonetheless, recall
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that those statistics were not used in the calibration process, while for instance in
Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003) moments describing wealth in-
equalities were targets. Moreover, the shopping economy presented in this paper
abstracts from important motives for wealth accumulation, such as bequests.
Table 1.11: Wealth distribution
Quintile Top Percentiles
Economy Gini First Second Third Fourth Fifth 90-95 95-99 99-100
USA (PSID 2006) .771 -.015 .005 .042 .142 .826 .157 .256 .244
Shopping .667 .011 .031 .065 .198 .696 .1636 .211 .114
SIM .569 .014 .052 .128 .258 .549 .138 .149 .056
VIII. Concluding Comments
The article advances a novel theory of the search for consumption as part of the
optimal savings model. Motivated by recent empirical findings on price disper-
sion and systematic heterogeneity in shopping time I use the model to address
the question how income fluctuations are passed on consumption expenditures
when the law of one price does not hold. I show that frictions in the purchasing
technology generate important implications for the aggregate consumption. The
shopping effort increases the level of risk sharing and brings predictions of the
model much closer to the empirical counterparts than the standard incomple-
markets model without frictions in purchasing technology. Moreover, the level
of consumption and wealth inequalities are amplified as well and in this sense
the theory contributes to the literature of inequality as well.
More broadly, the model is a first step to understand macroeconomic impli-
cations of search for consumption. It can provide interesting structural insight
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into some recent empirical findings on household consumption. For instance,
Stroebel and Vavra (2016) documented reactions of retail prices to changes in
local house prices, with elasticities of 15–20%. Using my model it can be ratio-
nalized by an increase in share of consumption of homeowners, who are most
likely captive customers. Consequently, the aggregate price search decreases and
retailers adjust their pricing strategy to the new distribution of consumption by
charging on average higher prices.
The model can be extended to a more general setup. In another paper (Ka-
plan and Pytka, 2016), which is being developed, we use the proposed search
protocol in an economy with both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. The model is
tailored to quantitatively address policy-related questions, in which household
consumption plays an important role. The framework allows studying the rela-
tionship between the retail market and the production sector from a macroeco-
nomic standpoint. In addition to this, the shopping effort generates a real effect
on output. Two possible applications are suggested. First, our model is likely
to give some insight into the source of transition of unskilled workers from the
production sector to the retail market observed in the data. Second, the model
can be used for studying monetary policy in a framework where price sticki-
ness is a result, not an assumption. We claim that product market frictions in the
transactions technology can replace the price-setting rigidities. Moreover, unlike
existing Keynesian models, our economy does not require firms or households
to be off their optimality conditions.
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Bargain Hunting in Equilibrium Price
Dispersion
I. Introduction
A renewed interest in the explicit role of the demand in shaping economicaggregates resulted in increased popularity of models where the market
power of firms depends on individual consumption decisions of buyers. One of
prominent examples of such economies is a model of endogenous price distri-
bution due to Burdett and Judd (1983). This simple and elegant model allows to
generate price dispersion, which arises as a result of a game between the sell-
ers and the buyers. A good understanding of the equilibrium properties of this
model is very useful if not essential for any further applications. Especially, the
stability with respect to the buyers’ behavior is of particular interest as their
changing consumption decisions lie at the heart of the propagation mechanism
proposed by Kaplan and Menzio (2016).
In this paper I contribute towards existing literature in two ways: (i) I study
equilibrium properties of the model of Burdett and Judd (1983) and I show that
only some allocations can be supported by stable equilibria, (ii) I present the
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modification of the original model that allows me to recover equilibrium stability
of all allocations. The former contribution could be used to criticize the quan-
titative results of models calibrated to unstable equilibria. However, the latter
contribution provides the modified framework that allows to support existing
results without any recalibrations.
In the course of the analysis I proceed in the following way. First, I show
how in the original model the multiplicity of dispersed equilibria arises. The fact
of the multiplicity is present in the original paper, but the actual discussion on
its source is omitted. Next, I study stability properties of both equilibria using a
tâtonnement process in which the consumers change their price search behavior
in the direction that minimize their cost of search. It turns out that according
to this notion of stability the low-search equilibrium is unstable while the high-
search one and the degenerate Diamond (1971)-type are stable. Any perturbation
to the low-search equilibrium gives rise to convergence towards one of stable
equilibria. Then I show that a feasible allocation can be supported either as the
low-search equilibrium or the high search one and it is never the case that it can
be characterized in two ways. This observation is important because it shows
that allocations characterized by the low-search equilibria cannot be stable.
To recover the equilibrium stability of all allocations I propose the modifi-
cation of the original model on the side of buyers. In the original model every
buyer is sampled with one price quotation costlessly and they can receive one
additional offer by paying a fixed search cost. In equilibrium the consumers are
indifferent between both actions and mix both strategies. The search cost is indi-
visible and stochastic (whether it is paid depends on a pure strategy sampled by
the agent). Here I consider an alternative specification of the buyer’s problem. I
assume that the search effort is divisible, deterministic, and features decreasing
marginal returns. The consumers decide upon the probability of two draws and
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its marginal cost is increasing. The number of price offers received by the con-
sumer is drawn and the probability of two price quotations depends on the search
effort. As I show this economy features the unique equilibrium in the class of
the symmetric and dispersed equilibria and the degenerate Diamond (1971)-type.
The former is stable while the latter is unstable.
Relations to the existing literature. Stability properties of equilibria in the
model of Burdett and Judd (1983) were analyzed before in papers due to Hop-
kins and Seymour (1996, 2002) and Lahkar (2011). The authors use an evolu-
tionary approach to study the stability of the sellers’ behavior in the version of
the model where the price space is discretized. My article differs from those pa-
pers in three dimensions. First, the notion of stability I use is different because I
consider tâtonnement stability. This concept was proposed in the formal way by
Samuelson (1947) for competitive markets and was adapted to the case of coordi-
nation games by Matsuyama (1999, 2002). Second, I focus on possible distortions
originated from the buyers’ behavior, while the sellers always charge prices that
are the best responses to the buyers’ actions. Finally, the approach I employ does
not require the discretization of the price space and in this sense I work on the
original version of the model. While the evolutionary stability and the sellers’
behavior might be interesting for the literature of industrial organization, my
approach is more suitable for macroeconomic applications of the model for the
reason mentioned below.
In the macroeconomic literature for some time a renewed interest in the ex-
plicit role of demand in determining aggregates has been observed. Krueger,
Mitman, and Perri (2016) embed a reduced-form demand externality into the
business cycle model with household heterogeneity and they show that this ex-
tension adds an endogenous persistence and amplification of responses of the
model to technology shocks. The microfoundations for this effect can be pro-
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vided either using the competitive search due to Moen (1997) as in Bai, Ríos-
Rull, and Storesletten (2017) or using the model of Burdett and Judd (1983) as in
Kaplan and Menzio (2016). The behavior of the buyers lies at the heart of this
mechanism. Consequently, a good understading of the possible unstability origi-
nated from the buyers’ side is a prerequisite for using the Burdett and Judd (1983)
model in this context.
Finally, the result of the paper which shows that every allocation can be gen-
erated by an appropriate choice of the price search cost function is in the similar
spirit to the one obtained by Mortensen (2005) for monetary search models due
to Head and Kumar (2005). The author presented how to simplify the model by
assuming an exogenous Poisson distribution of the number of received price of-
fers per period and how this distribution can be supported as the solution to the
buyer’s problem. In this sense my result is analogous but for the class of Burdett
and Judd (1983) models. Every price search intensity can be supported as the
solution to the buyer’s problem.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II, I set out the prob-
lem of retailers, which is common to both specifications. In section III, I present
the problem of buyers in the original version proposed by Burdett and Judd (1983)
and characterize equilibrium allocations. In section II, I propose the alternation.
Section V concludes.
II. Firms
Theproblem of firms is common to bothmodels and for this reason it is presented
in one section.
Let p be the reservation price common to all buyers. There is a continuum
of firms of fixed measure. All firms face the same marginal cost standardized to
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one. Every retailer is matched with a single buyer only. The buyer is captive
and committed to purchasing at any price below p with probability 1 − q and
with probability q is matched with two different retailers and chooses the lower
price. Given a price distribution of prices set by all firms denoted Fq∗(p), the
probability that the price p quoted by the retailer will be accepted is:
(1− q) + 2q (1− Fq∗(p)) , (2.1)
where 2q (1− Fq∗(p)) is the probability that the firm will be visited by a buyer
with an alternative offer that is higher than the quoted price p. Then the profit
function for this price is equal to:
pi(p) = {(1− q) + 2q (1− Fq∗(p))} (p − 1). (2.2)
Burdett and Judd (1983) show that for a given probability q > 0 of two draws,
hereinafter also referred to as an average price search intensity, there exists the
unique best-response1 price dispersion:
Fq(p) =

0 for p < p,
1− 1−q
2q
[p−pp−1] for p ∈ [p, p],
1 for p > p,
(2.3)
where p = 1 + (p − 1) 1−q
1+q .
The function that defines the price distribution is an element of an equilibrium.
Even though different retailers charge different prices, the profit must be the
same for all equilibrium prices.
1I use the term best-response to stress that an equilibrium requires the endogenization of the
behavior of buyers q.The subsequent sections are dedicated to this matter.
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III. Indivisibility of Price Search
In this section I outline the problem of the buyers in the original version due to
Burdett and Judd (1983). Next I characterize the equilibrium allocations. There
always exists one degenerate equilibrium and for sufficiently low search cost
there are additional two dispersed equilibria (or for a knife-edge case there is
the unique dispersed equilibrium). The equilibrium with the lower average price
search is shown to be unstable. Finally, I present a result saying that no allo-
cation with the average price search lower than q ≈ .634815 can be supported
as the stable equilibrium. This result is illustrated by examples of calibrations of
unstable allocations used in the literature.
A. The Problem of the Buyers
There is a continuum of consumers of measure one. Every buyer is sampled with
one price quotation costlessly. The consumer can receive an additional offer, but
she must decide on it before learning the first drawn price. If she decides to
sample the second price, she must pay a search cost equal to c.The problem of
the consumer minimizing the expected cost of buying one unit of consumption
is as follows:
minq∈[0,1](1−q)
 p∫
p
pdFq∗(p)
+q
c + ∫∫
(p1,p2)∈[p,p]2
min{p1, p2}dFq∗(p1)dFq∗(p2)

(2.4)
where:
• ∫ pp pdFq∗(p) is the expected price from one draw,
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• ∫∫
(p1,p2)∈[p,p]2 min{p1, p2}dFq∗(p1)dFq∗(p2) is the expectedminimum from
two independent draws,
• q∗ is the average choice of all consumers and is taken as given by the
consumers.
The consumer chooses the probability q that she samples two prices and accepts
the lower one.
Definition 7 (Equilibrium price dispersion) A dispersed equilibrium is con-
stituted by a cdf Fq∗(p), probability of two draws q∗, and profits of the retailers pi
such that:
i. every price from the support of Fq∗(p) maximizes the problem of the retailers
(3.1) and yields the same profit, pi;
ii. price search q∗minimizes the expected cost of purchasing a unit of consumption
according to (2.4).
In a dispersed equilibrium consumers must be indifferent between sampling
one price with the higher expected value and two prices with the lower expected
value but with the additional cost of search c.This equilibrium condition can be
derived from the first-order problem of (2.4):
c = p∫
p
pdFq∗(p)− ∫∫
(p1,p2)∈[p,p]2
min{p1, p2}dFq∗(p1)dFq∗(p2),
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=W(q∗)
(2.5)
whereW(q∗) is the expected price difference between a lottery with one price
offer and a lotterywith two price offers. In the equilibrium allocation the solution
to (2.5) coincides with q∗ observed by the firms.
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There are two possible interpretations of the solution q. First, it can be con-
sidered as a mixed strategy randomizing over two pure strategies, two draws
with additional cost or one draw. Alternatively, it can be considered as a frac-
tion of households that ex-ante decide upon drawing two prices, in the analogous
way to the problem of indivisible labor supply due to Rogerson (1988, Sections
2 and 3). Then q is such a fraction that exactly equalizes the cost of search with
the price gain from two draws. Both interpretations are actually equivalent. The
only difference is that the former is the characterization that is stochastic and
constitutes a symmetric equilibrium, everyone chooses the same probability q,
while the latter is deterministic and the equilibrium is not symmetric, buyers of
measure q sample two prices and the complementary measure of 1−q draw one
price only.
B. Non-Uniqueness
Burdett and Judd (1983) show there can be zero, one, or two dispersed equilib-
ria and one degenerate Diamond (1971)-type equilibrium with q = 0 and the
monopoly price p = p charged by all retailers. The expected price difference
between lotteriesW(q∗) is not monotonous in q∗. Given the form of the equi-
librium dispersion, the expected values of both price lotteries, ∫ pdFq∗(p) and∫∫ min{p1, p2}dFq∗(p1)dFq∗(p2) decrease in q. However, for values below
a level of the price search intensity maximizing the expected price difference,q := argmaxqW(q), the expected price of the lottery with two offers decreases
faster than the former one. This constrasts the relationship for q > q,where the
effect of an increase in q is higher for the lottery with one price. Consequently,W(q∗) increases in q for q < q and decreases for for q > q.
The economy features two equilibria if the cost c is lower thanW(q), one
equilibrium if c = W(q), and no dispersed equilibria if c > W(q). Figure 2.1
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depicts the non-uniqueness with two dispersed equilibria, low-search qL and and
high search qH , and the degenerate Diamond (1971)-type one with q = 0.
Figure 2.1: Non-uniqueness of equilibria
q
Search cost, c
Expected price differential,W(q)
0
c
0 q L q H
C. Non-Stability
Having defined and characterized the equilibrium allocation(s) I am in the po-
sition to study their stability properties. To this end I employ the methodology
adapted from the literature of strategic complementarities and coordination fail-
ure. Assume that households are split into two fractions, with measure of µ and
1 − µ, which are also used to denote the types of consumers. The problem of
the buyers is as the one presented in the previous section and is identical for
both types. Denote their probability of sampling two draws by qµ and q1−µ,
respectively. Then the average probability of two draws of a visiting buyer isq∗ = µqµ + (1 − µ)q1−µ. LetW(qµ, q1−µ) := W (µqµ + (1− µ)q1−µ) be the
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expected difference between two lotteries for consumers playing qµ and q1−µ.
To study the stability properties of equilibria I use the following process:
q˙t =Wt(qµ, q1−µ)− c. (2.6)
The tâtonnement dynamics of this kind is inspired by Matsuyama (1999, 2002).
The logic is that, for fixed actions of the consumers of type 1− µ, the buyers of
type µ change their price search behavior in the direction that decreases their
expected cost of purchasing a good. An equilibrium is considered to be stable if
a small change in actions played by one type is not propagated further and the
system (2.6) does not evolve to a different equilibrium. The stability properties
of all equilibria are discussed below.
For further analysis it is convenient to introduce following definitions in the
spirit of Cooper and John (1988):
Definition 8 (Price Differential Spillovers) Actionsmade by households of one
type generate spillover effects on the expected difference between the price lotteries
of the other type in the following way:
i. if ∂q1−µW(qµ, q1−µ) > 0, then the game features positive price differential
spillovers on the players playing qµ;
ii. if ∂q1−µW(qµ, q1−µ) < 0, then the game features negative price differential
spillovers on the players playing qµ;
iii. if ∂qµW(qµ, q1−µ) > 0, then the game features positive price differential
spillovers on the players playing q1−µ;
iv. if ∂qµW(qµ, q1−µ) < 0, then the game features negative price differential
spillovers on the players playing q1−µ.
65
According to this definition price search of households of one type has a direct
impact on the price difference between lotteries of the other type. In the Burdett
and Judd (1983) economy the positive price differential spillovers for both types
of agents exist for search allocations q ∈ [0, q] The higher average price search
exerted by one type of households amplifies the difference between the price
lotteries and creates incentives for making a higher price search. By contrast, for
price search higher than q the negative price differential spillovers are observed.
The higher average price search exerted reduces the difference between the price
lotteries and creates incentives for making a lower price search.
A small positive perturbation ε > 0 in q = qH + ε make retailers decrease
their prices. The change in the expected price of one draw will be higher than
for the lottery with two draws, thus decreasing the expected difference between
two lotteries. The benefit of sampling a second offerW(q) will be lower than
the cost of search c.Consequently, consumers would not havemore incentives to
increase probability of two draws even more. The same logic applies to a positive
disturbance in the degenerate equilibrium q = 0.
In the similar manner, a small negative perturbation ε < 0 in q = qH + ε
make retailers increase their prices. The change in the expected price of one draw
will be higher than for the lottery with two draws, thus increasing the expected
difference between two lotteries. The benefit of sampling a second offerW(q)
will be higher than the cost of search c. Consequently, consumers would not
have more incentives to decrease probability of two draws even more for the
positive disturbance.
Those two observations show that in the neighborhood of both equilibria
price search exhibits strategic substitutabilitymaking the allocations self-sustainable.
The higher (lower) price search is not amplified by similar actions of other buy-
ers. On the contrary, it fosters the opposite action. This leads to the conclusion
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that both the degenerate equilibrium and the high-search equilibrium are stable.
Figure 2.2: Stability of equilibria.
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On the other hand, a small positive perturbation ε > 0 in q = qL + ε make
retailers decrease their prices. The change in the expected price of one draw
will be lower than for the lottery with two draws, thus increasing the expected
difference between two lotteries. In the neighborhood of this equilibrium price
search exhibits strategic complementarity. Any disturbances in the allocation
entail similar actions by households of the other type. As a result, the jittered
allocation gives rise to convergence towards one of the stable equilibria, the de-
generate in case of negative shocks or the high-search equilibrium in case of
positive ones.
The discussion is depicted in Figure 2.2 and is concluded with the following
theorem:
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Theorem 9 Suppose c < W(q). Then there exist two dispersed equilibria, high-
search with q = qL and low-search with q = qH , and one degenerate q = 0.
The degenerate and high-search equilibria are stable. The low-search equilibrium is
unstable.
The next lemma is very useful for characterizing allocations q that can be
rationalized as stable equilibria:
Lemma 10 The maximizer q of the expected difference between lotteries W(q)
does not depend on the reservation price p.
Proof Here I present the sketch of the proof and full derivations are relegated
to Appendix IV. The idea of the proof is to show that the maximizer q does not
change in p, i.e. ∀p>1∂q∂p = 0.
First I start by deriving the first-order condition consituting q :
∂qW = 0. (2.7)
The equation does not have the closed-form solution so I use the implicit function
theorem to determine ∂q∂p provided that ∂qW = 0. Next I make a guess, basing
on a numerical solution to (2.7), that q ≈ .634815. If the lemma is true then for
every value p, the marginal effect of p on q should be zero (or very close to zero
due to the numerical error). It turns out that the effect ∂q∂p
∣∣∣q=.634815 is of the order
of magnitude −7, which can be equalized with zero.
Figure 2.3 illustrates Lemma 10 at work. The reservation price p influences
the value of W(q) for every q ∈ (0, 1) and plays also a role in the value of
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Figure 2.3: The maximum ofW(q) does not depend on p.
q
W(q
)
q ≈ .6348158
p = 100p = 42p = 10
∂qW(q) for q ∈ (0, 1) \ {q}. However, the value of the maximizer q is constant
and does not change in p.
Both Theorem 9 and Lemma 10 set out the stability condition for allocationq, which has an important quantitative implication. All allocations with price
search intensity q < q ≈ .634815 are unstable in the version of the economy
proposed by Burdett and Judd (1983)2. The quantitative results of models cali-
brated to unstable equilibria can be criticized for describing allocations that can
be transitory. However, in the subsequent section I propose a method that can
be used to recover the stability of all allocations.
2There are examples of such parameterizations existing in the literature (e.g., Kaplan and
Menzio, 2016; Albrecht, Postel-Vinay, and Vroman, 2015).
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IV. Price Search with Bargain Hunting
In this section I propose a refinement of the original model that overcomes the
drawbacks presented in the previous section. It allows to generate the unique
dispersed symmetric equilibrium, which is shown to be stable regardless of allo-
cation q.As a result, the destructive implication ofTheorem 9 and Lemma 10 can
be fixed, if one uses the proposed framework as the rationalization of calibrated
allocations in place of the original version. The alternation is introduced on the
consumer side, in which the cost of search is exerted in the deterministic way
and is strictly convex. The problem of the firms is the same as in the original
framework.
A. The problem of the Buyers
There is a continuum of consumers of measure one. Every buyer is sampled with
one price with probability 1 − q or two price quotations with some probabilityq.The probability depends on the effort exerted by the consumer and is convex
in q. In particular, assume that effort is equal to q2
2
.The problem of the consumer
minimizing the expected cost of buying one unit of consumption is as follows:
minq∈[0,1](1− q)
p∫
p
pdFq∗(p) + q ∫∫
(p1,p2)∈[p,p]2
min{p1, p2}dFq∗(p1)dFq∗(p2) + q2
2
.
(2.8)
In the original framework, the consumer mixes two pure strategies, q = 0 andq = 1. The cost of search c is made only conditioned on sampling the action
that chooses to draw to two price offers (q = 1). However, in the described
problem, it is not the case. All households make costly effort and having exerted
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this effort, it is sampled whether the consumer receives one or two offers. This
structure of the problem resembles bargain hunting. The consumers that look for
price bargains pay on average lower price but also they make search effort with
certainty.
The solution to the problem of consumer is:
q =W(q∗), (2.9)
where q∗ is taken as given.
An equilibrium for this setup is analogous to the original one:
Definition 11 (Equilibrium price dispersion with bargain hunting) Adis-
persed equilibrium is constituted by a cdf Fq∗(p), probability of two draws q∗, and
profits of the retailers pi such that:
i. every price from the support of Fq∗(p) maximizes the problem of the retailers
(3.1) and yields the same profit, pi;
ii. price search q∗minimizes the expected cost of purchasing a unit of consumption
according to (2.8).
B. Uniqueness and Stability
The economy features one degenerate equilibrium q = 0 and zero or one dis-
persed equilibrium q∗. For q > 0, the expected price differenceW(q) and the
marginal cost of search q cross each other at most once. This fact is depicted in
Figure 2.4.
To study the stability properties of equilibria in this economy I employ the
same methodology and an analogous tâtonnement process (2.6) to the one from
the previous section:
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Figure 2.4: Uniqueness of dispersed equilibrium
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q˙t =Wt(qµ, q1−µ)− q. (2.10)
The subtracted term is the only difference between this process and (2.6). Here
the marginal search cost is increasing. Using analogous logic to the previous
economy, a small positive perturbation ε > 0 in q = q∗ + ε leads to reducing
the expected difference between two lotteries. At the same time, due to strong
convexity of the search cost function, the cost of higher q will increase. Similarly,
a small negative perturbation ε < 0 in q = q∗ + ε will leads to an increase in
the expected difference between two lotteries and to a decrease in the marginal
cost. Therefore, in q = q∗ consumers would not have incentives to change their
actions in response to small perturbations. In addition to this the degenerate
equilibrium is unstable3. A small positive perturbation results in convergence to
3I am grateful to Guido Menzio for suggesting this point.
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the stable equilibrium with q = q∗.
Figure 2.5: Only the dispersed equilibrium is stable
q
0 q∗
Stable equilibrium q∗
Unstable equilibrium q = 0
The discussion is depicted by Figure 2.5 and is concluded with the following
theorem:
Theorem 12 There exist one dispersed equilibrium with price search q = q∗ and
one degenerate q = 0.The dispersed equilibrium is stable. The degenerate equilib-
rium is unstable.
Finally, I am in the position to present a result that enables to rationalize any
allocation q ∈ (0, 1) as the stable equilibrium fromTheorem 12:
Lemma 13 (Rationalizability) Given the reservation price p, every allocationq∗ ∈ (0, 1) can be rationalized by the search cost function:
c(q) = W(q∗)q∗ · q22 , (2.11)
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where q∗ is taken exogenously by the buyer.
Proof Let the cost function be of the following form c(q) = αq2
2
. Then the
solution to the problem of buyers satisfies: αq = W(q∗). In equilibrium this
solution coincides with q∗. Consequently, α = W(q∗)q∗ , which gives (2.11).
Lemma 13 is illustrated in Figure 2.6. This result can be used to recover the
stability of all allocations, especially those that cannot be supported by the sta-
ble equilibrium in the original economy of Burdett and Judd (1983). What is
interesting this lemma does not imply that recalibrations of the existing quanti-
tative results are required. The only change that should have be done is applying
the argument basing on bargain hunting with convex search cost in place of the
original one with the indivisible search margin.
Figure 2.6: Every allocation is rationalizable
q
c(q) = .25q2c(q) = .5q2c(q) = q2W(q)
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V. Concluding Comments
In this article I studied equilibrium properties of a standard model of endoge-
nous price distribution due to Burdett and Judd (1983). In search economies of
this class typically there are two dispersed equilibria, low-search and high-search
one. I show that the low-search equilibrium is unstable while the high-search
equilibrium is stable. What is important every allocation can be characterized
only as one of those types. This finding substantially narrows the range of allo-
cations, in which the price dispersion is stable and its form is not a temporary
phenomenon. To recover the stability of every allocation I proposed an exten-
sion of the original model, which gives rise to one unique symmetric dispersed
equilibrium. This equilibrium is shown to be stable and it can be used to ratio-
nalize every allocation. In addition to this, in contrast to the original model the
degenerate Diamond (1971)-type equilibrium is unstable.
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3
Monetary Policy and the Price Search Channel
I. Introduction
In this paper, I study interactions between a bargain hunting behavior of house-holds and a redistributive channel of monetary policy. Traditionally, mone-
tary policy is analyzed using the New Keynesian perspective, in which the main
driving force is the intertemporal substitution of household consumption in the
presence of nominal rigidities. Most models of this class assume the existence
of the representative consumer, which results in abstracting from the role of
household heterogeneity. However, as recent studies by Auclert (2017) and Ka-
plan, Moll, and Violante (2017) show the redistribution channel is also important
part of the transmission mechanism. The effect of expansionary monetary policy
is amplified by the redistributive channel because households that benefit from
the expansion exhibit substantially higher marginal propensity to consume than
households who lose.
This paper contributes to the existing literature of the redistributive role of
monetary policy by introducing bargain hunting, an additional effect that may be
important to account for the redistributive channel. This effect consists in higher
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search effort exerted by low-income households than high-income consumers,
which has a direct impact on prices quoted by retailers. I show that money in-
jection to households reduces the inefficiency generated by non-competitive be-
havior of firms. This result stems from the fact that bargain hunters also feature
higher marginal propensity to consume. An increase in the fraction of the aggre-
gate consumption purchased by buyers with higher price search intensity causes
a reduction of the monopolistic power of the firms. As a result, a monetary ex-
pansion is amplified by lower consumption prices for all households. As I show
the quantitative model suggests that thanks to this effect the tension between
equity and efficiency is mitigated.
In the course of the analysis, I proceed in the following way. First, I start by
formulating an illustrative example of an economywhere the redistributive fiscal
policy can foster efficiency of the equilibrium allocation. The tension between
equity and efficiency motives is completely reduced and all households benefit
from higher redistribution and the output increases. This seemingly counterin-
tuitive result is possible thanks to the price channel. The redistribution reduces
market power of firms due to an increase in the number of transactions with
bargain hunters, thus causing equilibrium prices to fall. The effect of this policy
is that all households immediately benefit from paying lower prices. This mech-
anism is similar to the one outlined by Bai, Ríos-Rull, and Storesletten (2011),
where preference shocks in disutility from search has the real effect on shaping
aggregates.
Next, I embed consumption search into a pure-currency economy with id-
iosyncratic productivity risk, where money is the only storable good that can be
used as the mean of payment. As mentioned before the monetary policy is usu-
ally studied with the use of the channel relying on nominal rigidities. Here my
approach is different. The starting point of my analysis is a class of incomplete
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markets models which allows to focus on the redistributive effects generated
by monetary policy in the tradition of Bewley (1986), Scheinkman and Weiss
(1986), İmrohoroğlu (1992) or more recently Rocheteau, Weill, and Wong (2015)
and Lippi, Ragni, and Trachter (2015). On top of the model I introduce the search
for consumption in the spirit of Burdett and Judd (1983). The currency injection
leads to anticipated inflation. Households decide on their price search intensity
and firms set their prices depending on the aggregate shopping effort. In the
considered economy money transfers plays a double role. First, it provides an
additional instrument of insurance for smoothing consumption. This property is
typical for monetary models with incomplete markets as in İmrohoroğlu (1992)
or Scheinkman and Weiss (1986). Second, what is new in my analysis, lump-
sum transfers increase a fraction of consumption purchased by bargain hunters.
In response to this policy the firms decrease their real prices and their margins.
As a result, redistributive policy decreases inefficiency generated by the non-
competitive pricing behavior of the firms.
Burdett and Menzio (2017a,b) also use the search protocol in the tradition of
Burdett and Judd (1983) to study the transmission of monetary policy to the real
side of the economy. Nonetheless, there are two substantive differences between
my framework and the one proposed by the authors. Namely, they assume that:
(i) there exists the representative buyer, whose (ii) price search intensity is set
exogenously. Consequently, money injection does not provide insurance (due
to lack of idiosyncratic risk) and the market power of firms does not depend on
inflation (due to both exogenous price search and lack of idiosyncratic risk). In
their framework higher inflation unambiguously causes welfare to fail. As I show
this is not the case in my framework.
On the empirical side, the paper is motivated with two strands of the liter-
ature. First, Aguiar and Hurst (2007) and Kaplan and Menzio (2016) used price
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scanner data to document evidence that retired and unemployed households pay
on average lower prices than employed individuals for exactly the same kinds
of goods. Second, Auclert (2017) and Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2017) show
that the inflation can generate sizable wealth redistribution effect. Those two
observations combined can be a premise for studying what is the response of the
distribution of prices to redistributive monetary policy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II, I present an ex-
emplary economy which shows that redistributive policy can increase output
and overall welfare. In section III, I introduce the price search friction into a
pure-currency monetary economy. Section IV is dedicated to the calibration and
numerical solution of the model. In section V I use the monetary model to quan-
titatively evaluate the cost of inflation in the presence of price search. Section VI
concludes.
II. Efficiency and Bargain Hunting
I start by presenting an illustrating example how policies exploiting bargain
hunting can improve the welfare of all agents. To this end I use linear taxation
of labor income imposed on low-search (and high-income) households, which is
transferred to the bargain hunters. I show that thanks to this redistribution pol-
icy in this example all agentsmay be better off. The source of this result is that the
bargain hunting behavior decreases the non-competitive behavior of the firms.
The retailers facing a higher mass of transactions with bargain hunters respond
by setting prices closer to the competitive prices, which support the efficient al-
location. Consequently, this redistribution generates positive price externalities
on all consumers, who thanks to this policy pay lower consumption prices and
their real labor income increases.
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A. Model Environment
Setup. Time is discrete and goes on forever. There are two types of households,
savers of measure λ that have access to the market of shares of producers and
hand-to-mouth households of measure 1 − λ that consume their labor income
every period. Households obtain their consumption through a matching process
with producers of measure one. In one match only one unit of consumption can
be purchased. Thus consumption bundle of size c is a realization of a continuum
of matches. There is no uncertainty at the aggregate and individual level.
Firms. Every firm has access to common technology that produces perish-
able output using only labor input, according to the linear production functiony = N. The produced output is then sold on the decentralized market, where
households and firms meet each other. During one shopping visit the firm is
able to sell only a unit of consumption. The bargaining power is different for both
types of households. Savers meet two retailers with probability ψsa and choose
the lower sampled price and only one search with 1−ψsa,while hand-to-mouth
households make two searches with probability ψHtM , where ψsa < ψHtM .The
producer does not know whether a visiting household has drawn an alternative
offer from another firm. Shopping visits that constitute the aggregate consump-
tion is distributed equally amongst all firms. For further analysis it is convenient
to define some aggregate shopping statistics:
Ψ(−) =(1− ψHtM)(1− λ)cHtM + (1− ψPI)λcPI ,
Ψ(+) =2ψHtM(1− λ)cHtM + 2ψPIλcPI ,D =Ψ(+) +Ψ(−).
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With probability Ψ(−)D a household that is matched with the firm is captive and ac-
cepts any sampled price set by the firm below the upper bound,R.With the com-
plementary probability Ψ(+)D , the visiting household samples an alternative offer
from another producer and chooses the minimum of the drawn prices. Given the
realized demand for pricing strategy p denoted y(p) the firms maximize their
expected profit by choosing the real price (in terms of labor):
maxp (p − 1) · y(p) (3.1)
s.t.
y(p) =
Ψ(−) +Ψ(+) (1−G(p)) for p ≤ R,0 for p > R.
I assume that the retailers cannot differentiate themselves to increase the number
of matches and they are indistinguishable for households before making a visit. 1
Therefore, every retailer is visited by the same number of times,D.Depending on
the pricing strategy of the retailer a certain number of visits become effective.
Retailers setting the maximum price p = R target only at captive customers,
which leads to Ψ(−) = Ψ(−)D · D realized transactions.2 Offers made by retailers
setting such a price p that G(p) = 0 will be accepted by all visiting customers,
1For example, you can think of advertising as one way of differentiation. However, as But-
ters (1977) shows it does not change much in the behavior of the model. From the modeling
perspective the only difference is that the buyers are matched with advertisements rather than
with firms. All theoretical results stay unchanged.
2The maximum price is set here exogenously but consider a model where households have
access to home production technology generating a perfect substitute for market consumption
at the rate of transformation leisure to consumption equal to 1R . No price above R would beaccepted as households would substitute working and spending their labor income on the market
consumption with producing home production goods.
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D = (Ψ(−)D + Ψ(+)D ) ·D. In equilibrium all retailers receive the same profit denoted
Π
∗.
Equilibrium price distribution. The distribution of prices quoted by producers
is consistent with the aggregate shopping behavior of households in the econ-
omy. Using the logic presented in the original paper by Burdett and Judd (1983)
it is given by3:
G(p) =

0, for p < p,
D
Ψ(+)
− Ψ(−)
Ψ(+)
· R−1p−1 , for p ∈ [p,R],
1, for p > R,
(3.2)
where p = Ψ(+)D + Ψ(−)D R.
pHtM = (1− ψHtM)∫ pdG(p) + ψHtMEmin{p1, p2}, (3.3)
psa = (1− ψsa)∫ pdG(p) + ψsaEmin{p1, p2}, (3.4)
where ∫ pdG(p) is the expected price of a shopping trip with one visit only and
Emin{p1, p2} = ∫∫ min{p1, p2}dG(p1)dG(p2) is the expected minimum price
from a lottery with two sampled prices from different producers. Intuitively, the
price of consumption basket of savers is higher than the price paid by hand-to-
mouth consumers. This result comes immediately from the fact that the expected
value of one price offer is higher than the expected minimum of two draws and
from the fact that the savers draw one price more often.
Savers. Savers of measure λ decide upon consumption csat , labor supply lsat
and the size of purchased shares of the production firms denoted at at price pft .
3In the companion paper (Pytka, 2017) I explain in detail how to derive (3.2).
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One share pays dividend Π∗t every period. Then the problem of the savers reads
as follows:
max{ct ,lt}
∞∑
t=0 βt{u(ct)− g(lt)}, (3.5)
s.t.psat ct + pftat+1 = lt + at(pft +Π∗t ) ∀t,
where psat is defined by (3.4).
HtM households. Hand-to-mouth households of measure 1−λ decide on labor
supply lspt which is fully consumed in the same period, cspt .The problem of HtM
households reads then:
max{ct ,lt}u(ct)− g(lt) s.t. (3.6)pHtMt ct = lt,
where pHtMt is defined by (3.3).4
B. Equilibrium
Definition 14 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium for the economy is constituted by
a distribution of prices of consumption goods G(p), a price of firm stocks pf , con-
sumption and labor decisions of both types of households csat , lsat , cHtMt , lHtMt such
4Note that the labor is the numéraire in both problems. The same convention is used in
Section III.
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that:
i. households maximize their utility.
ii. producers maximize (3.1) and all equilibrium prices yield the same profit, Π∗.
iii. the market of shares: λat = 1,
iv. the labor markets clears:
(1− λ)lHtM + λlPI = ∫ y(p)dG(p),
v. the goods market clears:
(1− λ)cHtM + λcPI = ∫ y(p)dG(p),
vi. the aggregate consumption is consistent with the aggregate shopping trips:
(1− λ)cHtM + λcPI = Ψ(−) + Ψ(+)
2
.
The equilibrium and its efficiency can be characterized in the following way:
Proposition 15 i. Consumption and labor supply∀tcsat = c∗sa,∀tcHtMt = c∗HtM , lsat =l∗sa, lHtMt = l∗HtM are constant over time and are summarized by first-order con-
ditions:
u′(c∗HtM)pHtM = g ′(l∗HtM), (3.7)u′(c∗sa)psa = g ′(l∗sa). (3.8)
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ii. The price of stocks is equal to pf = β
1−βΠ∗.
iii. The equilibrium price dispersion is given by (3.2).
iv. The equilibrium allocation is inefficient.
Proof Property (i) can be derived using first order condition of the household
problems. Property (ii) comes from the Euler condition of the saver problem. The
proof of property (iii) can be found in (Pytka, 2017) and is analogous to the proof
due to Burdett and Judd (1983). In the efficient allocation chosen by the benev-
olent social planner the marginal rate of transformation equalizes the marginal
rate of substitution. This implies u′(c∗HtM) = g ′(l∗HtM) and u′(c∗sa) = g ′(l∗sa).
Nonetheless, the equilibrium prices pHtM and psa in this economy are always
greater than one, whenever at least ψHtM > 0.Therefore solutions to the prob-
lems of households (3.7) and (3.8) cannot be compatible with the allocation cho-
sen by the social planner. This observation concludes the proof.
The price search friction creates a wedge, which is the source of inefficiency.
The scale of this wedge could be mitigated by reducing prices paid by house-
holds. One way to achieve this could be a hypothetical increase in the fraction
of purchases with two draws holding other things constant:
Remark 16 An increase in the fraction of shopping visits with two draws Ψ(+)D in
the aggregate shopping behavior leads to a decrease in prices paid by both types of
households.
Proof The implied prices paid by households pHtM and psa can be written in
the following way:
pi = p + ∞∫p 1−G(x)− ψiG(x) + ψi[G(x)]2dx,
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where i ∈ {sa,HtM}.
The negative impact of prices can be shown by applying Leibniz’s integration
rule:
∂pi∂Ψ(+)D = (1− R) +
R∫
p
(2ψiG(x)− 1− ψi)(R − xx − 1
)( D
Ψ(+)
)2 dx.
The term (1 − R) is always negative and 2ψiG(x) − 1 − ψi is never positive.5
The factor R−xx−1 is positive for the interior of the price support. As a result, the
implied price pi decreases in Ψ(+)D for both types of households.
C. Numerical example
In this subsection I present a possible implication of Remark (16) for redistribu-
tive policies in economies characterized by the price search friction. Let the util-
ity of both types of households be of the GHH form, u(ct, lt) = log(c − l1+ϕ1+ϕ )
and parameters be equal to values presented in Table A.5. The values of the
parameters were set to generate high heterogeneity in price search intensities
(ψHtM ≫ ψsa) and high home production cost R.
Table 3.1: Equilibrium allocation.
Parameter R ϕ λ ψHtM ψsa
Value 5 .5 .5 .7 0
Now suppose that a linear labor income tax is imposed on savers τ = .05,
which finances the lump-sum transfer to hand-to-mouth households. In a fric-
tionless economy the savers are always worse off after such a reform. However,
5Just note that ψiG(x)− ψi ≤ 0 and ψiG(x)− 1 ≤ 0.
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in the considered economy transfers plays an additional role in decreasing ineffi-
ciency by reducing the bargaining power of producers. The fraction of consump-
tion purchased by hand-to-mouth households increases and this increases Ψ(+)D .
In response to that the producers set lower prices distributed according to for-
mula (3.2). In the parameterized example the benefits of lower prices offset the
cost of lower profits even for the savers. The tax reform has also a positive effect
on the labor supply as it increases the real wages for both types of households,
1pHtM and 1psa .
Table 3.2: Numerical example.
Laissez-faire Tax intervention
Spenders:cHtM .010 < .015lHtM .0466 < .0495pHtM 4.634 > 4.495
Period utility -4.601 < -4.209
Savers:csa .0817 < .0822lsa .0452 < 0.0476psa 4.701 > 4.585
Period utility -2.516 < -2.512
Aggregate:
Ψ(+)D .142 < .194∫ pdG(p) 4.701 > 4.585
Emin{p1, p2} 4.606 > 4.456
Π
∗ 3.339 > 3.142
Total output .0918 < .0971
III. Monetary Economy under Price Search
In this section I set out a pure cash-currency economy that features the frictions
in the purchasing economy in a similar way to the one described in Section II.The
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quantitative behavior of the economy is disciplined in the subsequent section.
Then the model is used to evaluate the welfare cost of inflation in the presence
of the price search friction.
A. Building Blocks of the Economy
Time is continuous and lasts forever. The economy is inhabited with a unit mea-
sure of households and a fixed measure of producers. There is a single perishable
consumption good produced with the use of labor input. The economy is pure-
currency in this sense that fiat money is the only storable good that can be used
as the mean of payment. The money supply grows at a constant rate and the
new money augments individual balances of households as lump-sum transfers.
The currency injection leads to anticipated inflation, which is embodied by a
constant increase in nominal prices of consumption and a constant decrease in
the value of money. Households face idiosyncratic risk in income, which gives
rise to a precautionary demand for liquidity. The goods produced by the firms
are traded on a decentralized market. Each household exerts some price search
effort. Given a price distribution, higher effort translates into lower expected
prices paid by a household. The production firms set their prices that maximize
their expected profit and which are the best response to the aggregate shopping
behavior of households.
Preferences. The households maximize their expected lifetime utility, which
is defined over flows of discounted consumption ct and price search intensity st
with the time discount rate ρ :
E0
∞∫
0
e−ρt {u(ct)− h(st)} dt, (3.9)
where u(·) is increasing and strictly concave and h(·) is increasing and strictly
88
convex.
Income risk. Households can be workers (i = w) or entrepreneurs (i = e).
Transition between occupations of a single household evolves exogenously and
stochastically over time and is modeled with a two-state Poisson process i ∈{w, e} with intensities λw and λe, respectively. The entrepreneurs receive an
equal share of profits generated by producers, Π∗. Each worker supplies labor,
which productivity is subject to idiosyncratic risk. In particular, I assume that
log labor earnings follow the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process:
z˙ = θ(z − z)dt + σdW, (3.10)
where the drift exhibits mean reversion to z with the speed equal to θ and the
diffusion component is generated with Wiener increments, dW.6
Price search of households. Each household makes a decision on the intensity
of search, s. The consumption purchased by households is the result of con-
tinuum of shopping lotteries. In a single shopping lottery a households can be
matched with one or two sellers and only a unit of goods can be purchased. The
probability of meeting two retailers depends on the price search intensity. With
probability 1− s, the household is captive during a lottery and accepts any sam-
pled price below the upper bound, R.With the complementary probability s the
buyer samples offers from two firms and chooses the minimum of the drawn
prices. Let G(p) be a cdf of relative prices (in terms of labor) observed in the
economy. Then the distribution of the effective price of a single purchase is a
result of the following compound lottery:
F(p, s) = (1− s)G(p) + s (1− [1−G(p)]2) . (3.11)
6This process is a continuous-time analogue of AR(1) with autocorrelation e−θ ≈ 1− θ. The
process is characterized by stationary distributionN(z, σ22θ ).
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Using the law of large numbers as in Pytka (2017) I am in the position to reduce
the dimensionality of the household problem and replace the distribution G(p)
with two sufficient statistics:
• the expected price of a single lottery with one drawn price:
p0 := ∫ pdG(p)
• the difference between expected prices from a lottery with one offer and
two offers:
MPB := p0 − ∫∫ min{p1, p2}dG(p1)dG(p2).
Consequently, the price of a unit of consumption is as follows:
p(s) = p0 − s ·MPB. (3.12)
Money holdings. In the economy asset markets are incomplete and house-
holds can store value using only fiat money, which is used to self-insure against
future fluctuations in the individual income. The money is issued by the govern-
ment in the supply of M˜t and grows at a constant rate pi. The nominal money
balances of individual households m˜ are augmented with a nominal lump-sum
transfer equal to τ˜t. Then the drift of nominal money holding of an individual
household is given by:
˙˜mt =

zt−p(st)·ctqt + τ˜t, for i = w,
Π
∗t−p(st)·ctqt + τ˜t, for i = e, (3.13)
where the real price of money (in terms of labor) is denoted qt.There is no credit
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market and borrowing is not allowed:
m˜t ≥ 0. (3.14)
The real money balance in terms of labor is equal tomt := qtm˜t.7 Its dynamics
evolves according to:
m˙t = ˙˜mtqt + m˜tq˙t. (3.15)
In a stationary environment the rate of return of money holdings coincides with
the rate of growth of the money supply, q˙tqt = −pi. If we combine (3.13) and (3.15)
we obtain the evolution of the real money holdings of workers:
m˙t = zt − p(st) · ct + τ˜tqt +mt q˙tqt = zt − p(st) · ct − pitmt + τt, (3.16)
and for entrepreneurs:
m˙t = Π∗t − p(st) · ct − pitmt + τt. (3.17)
The value of real lump-sum transfers τt := qt τ˜t is equal to a decrease in the real
value of the existing individual money balances:
τt = pi ·{ λwλe + λw
∫∫ mgw(m,z)dmdz + λeλe + λw
∫ mge(m)dm} ,
(3.18)
where λwλe+λw and λeλe+λw are the fractions of workers and entrepreneurs in a sta-
7The real value of money balance in terms of consumption is equal to qtp(st)m˜t and dependson the price search intensity of the household.
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tionary equilibrium and gw(m,z) and ge(m) (such that ∫∫ gw(m,z)dmdz = 1
and ∫ ge(m)dm = 1) are density functions of workers and entrepreneurs.
Firms. The problem of the firms is analogous to the one from Section II. The
only difference is that the aggregate shopping statistics are given by:
Ψ(−) =
∫ cw(m,z) (1− sw(m,z))gw(m,z)dmdz + ∫ ce(m) (1− se(m))ge(m)dm,
Ψ(+) =
∫ cw(m,z)2s(m,z)gw(m,z)dmdz + ∫ ce(m)2se(m)ge(m)dm,
D =Ψ(+) +Ψ(−).
B. Equilibrium
Definition 17 (Stationary Equilibrium) A stationary equilibrium of the econ-
omy is constituted by a sequence of prices of money in terms of labor {qt}, a distri-
bution of prices of consumption goods in terms of laborG(p), a set of decision rules
of workers cw(m,z), sw(m,z) and entrepreuners ce(m), se(m), and invariant
distributions of workers gw(a, z) and enterpreneurs ge(m) such that:
i. households maximize the expected utility (3.9) subject to the evolution of real
money holdings (3.16) and (3.17), income dynamics driven by idiosyncractic
labor productivity and occupational risk, and the borrowing limit (3.14);
ii. producers maximize (3.1) and all equilibrium prices yield the same profit, Π∗.
iii. the money market clears:
M = λwλe + λw
∫ mgw(m,z)dmdz + λeλe + λw
∫ mge(m)dm.
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iv. the labor markets clears:∫∫ zgw(m,z)dmdz = ∫ y(p)dG(p),
v. the goods market clears:
λwλe + λw
∫∫ cw(m,z)gw(m,z)dmdz+ λeλe + λw
∫ ce(m)ge(m)dm = ∫ y(p)dG(p)
vi. the aggregate consumption is consistent with the aggregate shopping trips
λwλe + λw
∫∫ cw(m,z)gw(m,z)dmdz+ λeλe + λw
∫ ce(m)ge(m)dm = Ψ(−)+Ψ(+)
2
.
C. Equilibrium Characterization
A stationary equilibrium with individual decisions on consumption and price
search intensities of households, a distribution of prices set by retailers, and joint
distribution of money holdings and income can be summarized with: a cdf of
prices G(p), and two systems of recursive differential equations: a Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation (henceforth, HJB) and Kolmogorow forward equation
(henceforth, KF).
The HJB equation for entrepreneurs with the real money holding m is as
follows:
ρve(m) = maxc,s∈[0,1]u(c)− h(s) + ∂mve(m) [Π∗ − p(s) · c − pim]+ (3.19)
+ λw (vw(m,z)− ve(m)) .
Thanks to the fact that the problem is studied in continuous time the income
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risk of entrepreneurs for becoming a worker with the average labor income z is
captured in an additive way by the term λw (vw(m,z)− ve(m)) . Notice that
this element does not affect the first-order condition for consumption and price
search. The entrepreneurs make decision on the flows of the utility from the
current consumption c and the disutility from the current price search intensitys, which for the optimal solution of the problem are equalized with benefits of
increasing the real money holdings, ∂mve(m)m˙.
TheHJB equation for workers with the real money holdingm and the incomez is represented in the following way:
ρvw(m,z) = maxc,s∈[0,1]u(c)− h(s) + ∂mvw(m,z) [z − p(s) · c − pim] +
(3.20)
+ λe (ve(m)− vw(m,z))+
+ ∂zvw(m,z)θ(z − z) + 1
2
∂2zzvw(m,z)σ2.
The main difference from the HJB equation of entrepreneurs comes from the
fact that the workers are subject to additional source of risk in labor earnings
modeled as a diffusion process. Those terms accounting for this kind of labor
risk are obtained directly from Itô’s lemma.
The stationary distribution of money holdings of the entrepreneurs satisfies
the KF equation:
0 = − ddm {(Π∗ − p(se(m)) · ce(m)− pim) · ge(m)}−λwge(m)+λe
∫ gw(m,z)dz.
(3.21)
The term −λwge(m) is the outflow of entrepreneurs who become workers and
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the term λe ∫ gw(m,z)dz is the inflow of workers with real money holdingm
and different productivities z distributed according to gw(m,z).
The stationary distribution of real money holdings of workers satisfies the
KF equation:
0 =− ddm {(z − p(s) · c − pim) · gw(a, z)} − λegw(m,z) + I{z=z}λwge(m)− ∂z(θ(z − z)gw(m,z)) + 1
2
∂zzσ2gw(m,z). (3.22)
The term −λegw(m) is the outflow of workers who become entrepreneurs and
the term I{z=z}λwge(m) (where I{z=z} is an indicator function) is the inflow
of entrepreneurs with real money holding m to the state with mean labor pro-
ductivity z. For other labor income states we do not observe any inflows of en-
trepreneurs. The last term−∂z(θ(z−z)gw(m,z))+ 12∂zzσ2gw(m,z) is obtained
by applying Itô’s lemma.
The stationary equilibrium allocation is the solution to the system of equa-
tions (3.19), (3.20), (3.21), (3.22), and (3.2).
IV. Mapping the Model to Data
Having outlined the structure of the economy I calibrate the model to replicate
empirical counterparts. The environment is quite complex and it is very hard to
find the analytical solution. To this end I employ numerical methods for solving
heterogeneous agent models in continuous time recently proposed by Achdou,
Han, Lasry, and Lions (2017).
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A. Numerical Implementation
The solution to the HJB equations (3.19) and (3.20) is constituted by first-order
conditions:
u′(c) = ∂mvw(m,z)p, u′(c) = ∂mve(m)p, (3.23)h′(s) = ∂mvw(m,z)MPBc, h′(s) = ∂mve(m)MPBc,p = p0 − sMPB.
These conditions always hold with equality thanks to the fact that the borrowing
condition (3.14) is replaced by state constraint boundary conditions:
u′( zp(s)
) ≤ ∂mvw(0, z)p(s), u′( Π∗p(s)
) ≤ ∂mve(0)p(s). (3.24)
Those constraints guarantee thatmarginal utility from consumption violating the
budget constraint is lower than the marginal value of wealth on the borrowing
constraint. Consequently, households never choose to consume more than that.8
The solution algorithm I implement relies on a finite difference method. Bar-
les and Souganidis (1991) presented conditions forwhich a computational scheme
using this method converges to the unique solution of HJB equations. In partic-
ular, I use an upwind scheme which in my setup consists in using a forward
difference approximation of ∂mve(m) and ∂mvw(m,z) for the positive drift of
real money holdings and a backward difference approximation when the drift
is negative. Achdou, Han, Lasry, and Lions (2017) have shown that a so called
8Notice that in the continuous-time version of the household problem the drift is smooth and
the borrowing constraint is never binding in the interior of the state space. The only possible
state in which the constraint can be violated ism = 0.
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implicit version of the scheme always converges.9
The prices set by producers depend on decisions on consumption and search
intensity of households and vice versa. In order to compute the numerical solu-
tion to the equilibrium allocation I use the following algorithm:
1. Start with an initial guess on value functions ve, vw, price statistics p0,MPB and real lump-sum transfers τ.
2. Solve HJB equations (3.19), (3.20) using first-order conditions (3.23), where∂mvw(m,z) and ∂mve(m) are approximated using the upwind scheme
and implicit method. Compute KF equations, (3.21) and (3.22), and equi-
librium distribution of real money holdings.
3. Given new distribution of real money holdings and policy function com-
pute G(p) from (3.2) and sufficient statistics p0, MPB and real lump-sum
transfers τ from (3.18). Stop if changes in p0, MPB, τ are small enough.
Otherwise, go to step (2) with updated statistics p0, MPB and real lump-
sum transfers τ, but with initial guesses ve, vw.
B. Calibration
Having outlined the setup and the numerical implementation I am in the po-
sition to discipline the quantitative behavior of the model. In the procedure I
chose four internal targets featuring the U.S. economy to calibrate values of five
parameters.10
Functional specification. All working households exhibit the common utility
function of the following form:
9The logic behind the implicit scheme is explained in great detail by Tourin (2013).
10One of the parameters, λe accounting for the probability of becoming an entrepreneur is
standardized to generate mass of 1% of the richest households.
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u(c)− h(s) = log(c)− η1zη2 1
1− s . (3.25)
Then the flows of consumption and price search intensity that solves the problem
of the household are as follows:
1c = ∂mve(m,z)p, (3.26)η1zη2 ( 1
1− s
)2
= p0 − sMPB. (3.27)
Given the value function ve(m,z) (or more precisely the finite-difference ap-
proximation of its derivative) and the effective price p, the consumption can be
pinned down analytically. For the chosen specification the price search inten-
stiy s,which one-to-one maps to p by (3.12), can be solved numerically for every
level of the income and it does not depend on the money holdings. The optimal
intensity decreases in z, which is consistent with empirical observations made
by Aguiar and Hurst (2007). At the same time, (3.27) does not depend on the real
money holdings. This choice is motivated by two things. First, to the best of my
knowledge, there are no studies on the relationship between effective consump-
tion prices and money holdings. Second, solving (3.27) requires implementing
root-finding routines. Focusing only on the relationship between prices and in-
come reduces the numerical complexity of the problem significantly.
The time discount rate ρ = .0838 was calibrated to match the relative ratio
of real money holdings to GDP of .32.The model was parameterized to capture
two targets corresponding to the product market, markups and the level of price
dispersion. The former one was set to 30%. Admittedly, it is higher than the level
of 10% from Basu and Fernald (1997), which is traditionally used in the New
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Table 3.3: Internal targets
Target Data Model
Money supply .32 .305
Markup .30 .281
Corporate profits .10 .112
Price dispersion 1.7 1.655
Keynesian literature. However, it is consistent with new microeconomic studies
on this matter such as Faig and Jerez (2005), Stroebel and Vavra (2016), or very
recent Anderson, Rebelo, and Wong (2017) and Loecker and Eeckhout (2017).
Kaplan and Menzio (2016) using price scanner data documented that the ratio of
the maximum to minimum prices varies between 1.7 and 2.6. Due to the fact that
the model does not feature heterogeneity in marginal cost, which may amplify
the price dispersion, I set this target to 1.7. The ratio of profits to the output was
set to be equal to .1, the average ratio of corporate profits after tax to GDP in the
US in the last ten years. The parameter λw was taken from Guvenen, Kaplan, and
Song (2014), which is the probability of leaving top 1% in one year. Given λw,
the parameter λe was set to generate the richest group of mass of 1%.11 The labor
income process is parameterized to match the annual autocorrelation ρε = .967
and variance of and σ2ε = .017 documented by Flodén and Lindé (2001).12 Finally
I set the inflation rate to be equal to pi = .02.
V. Cost of Inflation: AQuantitative Analysis
In this section I use the calibrated version of the model to quantitatively eval-
uate the cost of inflation in the presence of the price search friction. In the
11In the stationary environment this can be pinned down from λeλw+λe = .01.12Using the Euler-Maryuama approximation those statistics can be mapped into the parame-
ters characterizing the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, θ = e−ρ and σ2 = σ2εθ .
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Table 3.4: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Descriptionρ .0838 discount rateR 1.5524 maximum priceη1 .000475 relative utilityη2 5.4594 curvatureλe .00252 prob. of becoming entrepreneurλw .25 prob. of becoming worker
traditional literature of incomplete markets there is a tradeoff between equity
and efficiency. The inflation leads to eroding the real value of assets and makes
consumption smoothing through self-insurance more costly. On the other hand,
the money injection, which generates inflation, finances lump-sum transfers and
this provides an additional insurance, especially for cash-poor households. In the
economy featuring frictions in the purchasing technology there exists an addi-
tional channel. Namely, thanks to money transfers the fraction of cash-poor
households with higher price search increases. Consequently, in the line of the
example from Section II the bargain hunters reduce the inefficiency generated
by non-competitive pricing.
In the quantitative exercise I employ the methodology developed by Flodén
(2001) and inspired by Bénabou (2002). This approach relying on certainty-equivalent
consumptionmeasures allows to decompose thewelfare cost of inflation into two
components, the cost of uncertainty and the cost of inequality. Let the utility of
the benevolent social planner be over utility of households in the economy under
regime k be as follows:
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Wk (ckt (·), skt (·), gek , gwk ) := λeλe + λw
∫ E ∞∫
0
eρt{u(ckt )− h(skt )}dt
gek (m)dm+
+
λwλe + λw
∫∫ E ∞∫
0
eρt{u(ckt )− h(skt )}dt
gwk (m,z)dmdz.
(3.28)
The social welfare increases if consumption increases and price search decreases.
Convex preferences (concave u(c) and convex h(s)) implies that equity and cer-
tainty is preferred.
The overall cost of inflation can be calculated by solving for ω :
Wpi=.02 ((1 + ω)cpi=.02t (·), spi=.02t (·), gepi=.02, gwpi=.02) =Wpi=0 (cpi=0t (·), spi=0t (·), gepi=.02, gwpi=0)
(3.29)
where ω is the cost in terms of consumption and is interpreted as the percentage
amount of consumption in every state that the social planner is willing to give
to sacrifice to fully eliminate the inflation. Given social welfare in both regimes,
with the 2% inflation and without inflation the cost can be computed analytically:
ω := exp( Wpi=0Wpi=.02
)− 1. (3.30)
This cost can be further decomposed into two components stemming from
different motives of the social planner, uncertainty aversion and inequality aver-
sion. For further analysis it is convenient to define individual certainty-equivalent
consumptions, cw(m,z) and ce(m),which are solutions to following equations:
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ln cw(m,z)− h(S)ρ =E
∞∫
0
eρt (ln cwt − h(st)) , (3.31)
ln ce(m)− h(S)ρ =E
∞∫
0
eρt (ln cet − h(st)) , (3.32)
where S is the average price search in the economy. These terms can be in-
terpreted as consumption bundles that households in given states are willing to
accept for eliminating future uncertainty.13 LetC andC be the average consump-
tion and certainty-equivalent consumption in the economy:
C := λwλe + λw
∫∫ cw(m,z)gw(m,z)dmdz + λeλe + λw
∫∫ ce(m)ge(m)dm,
C := λwλe + λw
∫∫ cw(m,z)gw(m,z)dmdz + λeλe + λw
∫∫ ce(m)ge(m)dm.
Then the social cost associated with fluctuations in the individual income of
the households, punc can be expressed as the solution to the following equation:
lnC − h(S)ρ = ln ([1− punc]C)− h(S)ρ . (3.33)
This statistics measures how much the social planner is willing to sacrifice the
average consumption to reduce the income uncertainty completely. Notice that
this statistics is defined only over the average characteristics, thus it does not
depend on the distribution amongst households.
The complementary statistics, pineq evaluates the social cost associated with
13There are many possible ways of determining price search in the deterministic allocation.
In particular, Flodén (2001) suggests either fixing the value chosen in the uncertain economy for
given states or setting the average level in the economy. I use the latter method.
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inequality and solves the following equation:
ln ([1− pineq ]C)− h(S)ρ =Wk (c(·),S, ge, gw) . (3.34)
Thismeasure tells us howmuch the social planner is willing to reduce the average
certainty-equivalent consumption to equalize the distribution of consumption
completely. To compare allocations in both regimes, with inflation pi = .02 and
without inflation the following statistics are useful:
ωunc := 1− ppi=0unc
1− ppi=.02unc − 1,ωineq := 1− ppi=0ineq
1− ppi=.02ineq − 1,
where ωunc is the welfare gain of reducing uncertainty and ωineq is the welfare
gain of reducing inequality caused by eliminating inflation. Using the logic simi-
lar to Flodén (2001), the overall cost of inflation can be expressed in the following
way:
ω = (1 + ωunc)(1 + ωineq)− 1.
Having outlined the methodology I am in the position to present the results
of the quantitative experiment. In this exercise I compare two allocations, with
inflation pi = .02 and without inflation. In addition to this to better understand
the role of the purchasing friction I compare allocations for fixed price decisions
of the households or the firms:
1. full price adjustments - households and firms play the best responses to
actions of others. It is the baseline comparison between the stationary
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Table 3.5: Welfare cost of inflation
Type of adjustment ωunc ωineq ω
Full adjustment .0486 -.0051 .0434
Quoted prices only .0450 -.0047 .0401
Price search only .0502 -.0036 .0462
No adjustments .0502 -.0036 .0462
equilibria with and without inlfation,
2. no price adjustments - the distribution of prices and price search policies
are set to the optimal ones in the no-inflation equilibrium,
3. adjustments in price search only - households in both regimes play their
best responses but the distribution of quoted prices is set to the no-inflation
equilibrium,
4. adjustments in quoted prices only- firms play their best responses and set
prices optimally while the price search intensity of households depend is
fixed to policy functions constituting the no-inflation equilibrium.
Table 3.5 presents the results of the experiment. In the baseline scenario when
I compare both equilibrium allocations the welfare gain of reducing inflation is
equal to .0434.Thewelfare gains from inflation is lowest if households keep their
price search intensities and only retailers change their pricing. This effect is gen-
erated by the fact that the composition of households with lower consumption
and higher search intensity increases and this reduces inefficiency generated by
retailers. Households that are able to adjust their price search intensities decrease
their search which increases the welfare cost of inflation. The cost of the infla-
tion is highest if retailers stick to their pricing strategy. For such an economy
the redistributive price search channel is shut.
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VI. Concluding Comments
In this paper I studied the redistributive function of monetary policy in the pres-
ence of frictions in the purchasing technology. Using the calibrated model I
show that the welfare cost of inflation can be overstated when this channel is
not accounted for. The bargain hunting reduces inefficiency generated by the
non-competitive behavior of the firms. Thus, the redistributive policy targetting
at households with high marginal propensity to consume and low reservation
prices may be welfare improving.
The further work can be carried out in a few different directions. First, the
friction can be incorporated into a richer environmentwith amore realistic struc-
ture of assets with different returns and liquidity as in Kaplan and Violante (2014)
or Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2017). Second, the model can be used to provide
microfoundations for cyclicality of markups, consistent with very recent empir-
ical findings due to Hall (2014), Nekarda and Ramey (2013), Stroebel and Vavra
(2016), and Anderson, Rebelo, and Wong (2017). The cyclicality of markups in
this framework is quite intuitive and stems from the fact that an increase in aver-
age individual earnings reduces the number of bargain hunters, which gives rise
to higher market power of the firms and higher consumption prices. To study
this phenomenon, aggregate uncertainty should be introduced to the model. To
this end the methodology developed by Ahn, Kaplan, Moll, Winberry, and Wolf
(2017) can be extremely useful.
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A
Appendix
I. Data
II. Proofs for Subsection IV.B
A. Proof of Theorem (5).
Proof Lemma (4) implies that every retailer yields the same level of profits and
that the highest quoted price is equal to ζ.Theprofit of retailers charging ζ comes
only from captive consumers. The probability that a visiting buyer is captive is
equal to ∫ mt(x)(1+st(x))D (1− 2st(x)1+st(x)) .Then the profit is equal to:
S(ζ) = θ−α T∑t=1
∫ θ1−αmt(x)(1 + st(x))D
(
1− 2st(x)
1 + st(x)
)
(ζ − 1)dµt(x).
(A.1)
Table A.1: Deciles of weekly earnings
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
250.00 360.00 461.53 570.00 675.00 807.69 961.53 1192.30 1538.46
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Profits of retailers charging different prices p must be equal to S(ζ) (otherwise
those prices were not be chosen):
theta−α T∑t=1
∫ θ1−αmt(x)(1 + st(x))D
(
1− 2st(x)
1 + st(x)G(p)
)
(p − 1)dµt(x) = S(ζ).
The distribution of quoted prices given by (3.2) is the unique dispersed equilib-
rium given household search strategies.
III. Statistical Tables
IV. Proof of Lemma 10
∂q∂p ∣∣∣q=q = −∂p∂qW(q)∂2qW(q)
∣∣∣q=q. (A.2)
The formula for the integral of the one-price lottery is:∫ pdFq(p) = (1− q)((p − 1) log(p − 1) + p)
2q , (A.3)
and the expected price from one draw is given by:
p∫
p
pdFq(p) =(q − 1)(p − 1)
(
(q + 1) log( (1−q)(p−1)q+1 )− (q + 1) log(p − 1) + 2q)
2q(q + 1) .
Similarly, the formula for the integral of the two-price lottery is:
∫∫
min{p1, p2}dFq(p1)dFq(p2) =(1− q)2
(− (p−1)2p−1 − 2(p − 1) log(p − 1) + p)
4q2
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Table A.2: Statistical table for G(p)
Ψ(+)DG(p) .01 .1 .3 .5 .7 .9 .99
.99 1.000 .998 .991 .980 .958 .847 .337
.975 .999 .994 .981 .953 .892 .694 .166
.95 .999 .989 .958 .912 .809 .531 .095
.9 .998 .978 .921 .832 .684 .359 .045
.85 .997 .967 .888 .771 .592 .273 .035
.8 .996 .958 .855 .717 .518 .215 .025
.75 .995 .947 .823 .670 .459 .187 .025
.7 .994 .938 .795 .623 .418 .158 .015
.65 .993 .928 .772 .589 .376 .139 .015
.6 .992 .919 .744 .556 .351 .120 .015
.55 .991 .910 .720 .529 .326 .110 .015
.5 .990 .901 .702 .502 .301 .100 .015
.45 .989 .892 .678 .475 .276 .091 .015
.4 .988 .882 .660 .455 .260 .081 .015
.35 .987 .873 .641 .434 .251 .081 .015
.3 .986 .866 .627 .414 .235 .072 .005
.25 .985 .857 .608 .401 .226 .072 .005
.2 .984 .849 .594 .387 .210 .062 .005
.15 .983 .840 .580 .374 .201 .062 .005
.1 .982 .833 .566 .360 .193 .062 .005
.05 .981 .826 .552 .347 .185 .053 .005
.025 .981 .822 .543 .340 .176 .053 .005
.01 .980 .820 .543 .333 .176 .053 .005p .980 .818 .538 .333 .176 .053 .005
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Table A.3: Statistical table for G(p)
Ψ(+)DF(p) .01 .1 .3 .5 .7 .9 .99
.99 1.000 .998 .986 .960 .875 .464 .055
.975 .999 .994 .972 .912 .750 .321 .035
.95 .999 .987 .944 .845 .626 .225 .025
.9 .998 .976 .897 .744 .493 .167 .015
.85 .997 .965 .855 .677 .418 .139 .015
.8 .996 .954 .818 .623 .376 .120 .015
.75 .995 .943 .786 .576 .335 .100 .015
.7 .994 .934 .758 .542 .310 .100 .015
.65 .993 .923 .734 .515 .293 .091 .015
.6 .992 .914 .711 .488 .276 .081 .015
.55 .991 .904 .688 .468 .260 .081 .015
.5 .990 .895 .669 .448 .243 .072 .015
.45 .989 .886 .655 .428 .235 .072 .015
.4 .988 .879 .636 .414 .226 .072 .005
.35 .987 .870 .622 .401 .218 .062 .005
.3 .986 .862 .608 .387 .210 .062 .005
.25 .985 .855 .594 .380 .201 .062 .005
.2 .984 .848 .580 .367 .193 .062 .005
.15 .983 .838 .571 .360 .193 .062 .005
.1 .982 .833 .557 .347 .185 .053 .005
.05 .981 .826 .548 .340 .185 .053 .005
.025 .981 .822 .543 .340 .176 .053 .005
.01 .980 .820 .538 .333 .176 .053 .005p .980 .818 .538 .333 .176 .053 .005
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and the expected price from the minimum from two draws is given by:
∫∫
(p1,p2)∈[p,p]2
min{p1, p2}dFq(p1)dFq(p2) =(1− q)(p − 1)
2q2(q + 1)
{− (q2 − 1) log(−(q − 1)(p − 1)q + 1
)
+
(q2 − 1) log(p − 1) + 2q}
The expected price difference is defined as:
W(q) = p∫
p
pdFq(p)− ∫∫
(p1,p2)∈[p,p]2
min{p1, p2}dFq(p1)dFq(p2).
The maximizer q ofW(q) is the solution to:
∂qW(q) = 0,
where:
∂qW(q) =(p − 1)
(
(−q2 + q + 2) log( (1−q)(p−1)q+1 )+ (q2 − q − 2) log(p − 1) + 2q(q + 2))
2q3(q + 1) .
Next I make a guess that q ≈ .6348158
∂qW(q)∣∣∣q=.6348158 = 1.306013887361414× 10−7(p − 1).
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∂p∂qW(q)∣∣∣q=.6348158 = 1.306013887361414× 10−7.
Table A.4: ∂qW(q).
qp .1 .25 .6348158 .75 .9
1.1 .027 .019 1.306× 10−8 −.009 −.034
10 2.447 1.744 1.175× 10−6 −.803 −3.034
42 11.149 7.944 5.354× 10−6 −3.656 −13.821
1986 539.781 384.624 2.592× 10−4 −177.02 −669.174
Table A.5: ∂p∂qW(q).
q .1 .25 .6348158 .75 .9∂p∂qW(q) .272 .019 1.306× 10−8 −.089 −.339
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